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The climate is a common good,
belonging to all and meant for all.
Francis (2015)
Encyclical Letter Laudato si’
1.1. Background and Motivation
The climate on our planet is a common good. No one can be excluded from
it, but if everyone emits without limits, the climate will change. To mitigate
climate change, the emissions of greenhouse gases must be reduced. From the
perspective of economists, this global challenge requires to answer two funda-
mental questions: How can we achieve international cooperation to solve the
problem of the common good? How can we incentivize the internalization of
negative externalities of greenhouse gas emissions?
The costs for emission abatement accrue on an individual level, but the benefits
of abatement efforts are perceived globally. Thus, rational individuals have an
incentive to emit and free-ride on the abatement efforts of others. As a result, the
collectively desirable amount of emissions is exceeded, and the climate system is
overused. To solve this ”Tragedy of the Commons”, collective action is necessary
(Cramton et al., 2017). International negotiations, such as the United Nations
Climate Change Conferences, aim to solve this cooperation problem.
While those negotiations have so far only resulted in pledges but not in collec-
tive action, some countries have already implemented policy measures to inter-
nalize the negative externalities of emissions. For this purpose, economic theory
suggests price- or quantity-based instruments, e.g., carbon taxes or emissions
trading systems.
A price on emissions increases the costs for the emitters. If this price is set
equal to the social costs of carbon, the externalities of emissions are fully inter-
nalized, and the socially optimal emission level can be achieved (Pigou, 1920).
However, policymakers face the problem of determining the correct value for the
social costs of carbon, which itself is prone to significant uncertainties (Tol, 2005).
Instead of fixing the price, policymakers can also set a quantity target for emis-
sions. Thereby, the policymaker can guarantee to achieve the envisaged emission
level. Nevertheless, the problem remains of determining the correct quantity to
1
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mitigate climate change. Following the bargaining solution proposed in Coase
(1960), property rights are established by issuing emission allowances according
to the predefined target. The price and allocation of emission allowances are
determined by trading. Such emissions trading systems have the advantage of
allocating allowances efficiently both over time and across emitters.
The world’s largest emissions trading system is the European Union emissions
trading system (EU ETS). It was established in 2005 to reduce emissions in
the power sector and energy-intensive industries (European Parliament and the
Council of the European Union (2003)). Since then, the scope has been extended
on a geographical level, e.g., Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway joined in 2008,
as well as on a sectoral level, e.g., emissions from inner-European aviation were
included in 2012. Overall, the EU ETS currently covers around 40 % of the
European emissions. The annual supply of allowances declines over time, but
allowances can be transferred from one year to another (so-called banking of
allowances). Since the start of the third trading period in 2013, the EU ETS
has been reformed multiple times: At the beginning of the third trading period,
the number of allowances in circulation has piled up, mainly due to the recession
caused by the financial crisis. Thus, the backloading reform in 2014 shifted
the allowance supply to the future by a one-time measure. The reform in 2015
introduced the market stability reserve (MSR), which absorbs allowances from
the initial supply based on the number of allowances in circulation. Thereby,
it automatically delays the allowance supply from 2019 onwards. In 2018, the
overall allowance supply was reduced, and furthermore, a cancellation mechanism
is introduced from 2023 onwards, which renders allowances invalid if the MSR
volume exceeds the predefined threshold.
The reforms in the third trading period have changed the EU ETS substan-
tially. By making the allowance supply an endogenous function of firms’ banking,
the reformed EU ETS has become a complex system, which has gained much at-
tention in recent academic research. The individual chapters of this thesis cover
different aspects of emissions trading systems and, in particular, the EU ETS.
Chapter 2 decomposes the different amendments of the EU ETS reform and
evaluates the cost effectiveness of the single amendments. Chapter 3 analyzes
the effects of a carbon price floor (CPF) in the reformed EU ETS and compares
two different designs of a CPF. Chapter 4 includes behavioral aspects such as
myopia and risk aversion to explain the observed market outcomes between 2013
and 2019. Finally, Chapter 5 challenges a common assumption on the shape of
marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves and discusses the implications for the
EU ETS. Each chapter is based on an article to which all authors contributed
equally:
Chapter 2: The Reformed EU ETS - Intertemporal Emission Trading with Re-
stricted Banking (with Johanna Bocklet, Lukas Schmidt, and Theresa
Wildgrube).
Published in Energy Economics, Vol. 84, 2019 (Bocklet et al. (2019)).
2
1.2. Outline of the Thesis
Chapter 3: A Carbon Price Floor in the Reformed EU ETS: Design Matters!
Published in Energy Policy, Vol. 147, 2020 (Hintermayer (2020)).
Chapter 4: How Does the EU ETS Reform Impact Allowance prices? The Role
of Myopia, Hedging Requirements and the Hotelling Rule (with Jo-
hanna Bocklet).
EWI Working Paper Series, No. 01/2020 (Bocklet and Hintermayer
(2020)). Revised and resubmitted to the Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management.
Chapter 5: On the Time-Dependency of MAC Curves and its Implications for
the EU ETS (with Lukas Schmidt and Jonas Zinke).
EWI Working Paper Series, No. 08/2020 (Hintermayer et al. (2020)).
The remainder of this introduction is structured as follows: Section 1.2 com-
prises a summary of each chapter. Further, Section 1.3 gives an overview of the
used methods, discusses the underlying assumptions, and points out opportuni-
ties for future research.
1.2. Outline of the Thesis
1.2.1. The Reformed EU ETS - Intertemporal Emission Trading
with Restricted Banking
The EU ETS has changed fundamentally with the implementation of the mar-
ket stability reserve (MSR), the increase of the linear reduction factor, and the
introduction of the cancellation mechanism. Chapter 2 develops a discrete-time
model of the EU ETS as an intertemporal allowance market. According to the
Hotelling rule, prices of a scarce, non-renewable resource rise with the interest
rate as long as the aggregated bank of allowances is non-empty. The recent re-
forms of the EU ETS are accurately depicted within the model, which allows for
a decomposition of the effects of the individual amendments and the evaluation
of their cost effectiveness.
The MSR delays the allowance supply and shifts emissions to the future, but
the total number of allowances remains unaffected. The cancellation mechanism
causes a one-time cancellation of around two billion allowances, which reduces
the overall emission cap. Consequently, long-run allowance prices increase, but
the short-run impact on the emission and price path is negligible. However, the
increased linear reduction factor reduces the allowance supply by nine billion




1.2.2. A Carbon Price Floor in the Reformed EU ETS: Design
Matters!
Despite the EU ETS reform, the introduction of a carbon price floor (CPF)
is widely discussed among scholars and policymakers. Chapter 3 analyzes the
effect of a European CPF in the reformed EU ETS. Due to the cancellation
mechanism, a CPF can reduce overall emissions in the reformed EU ETS. The
Hotelling model of the EU ETS with the MSR and the cancellation mechanism
(introduced in Chapter 2) is amended by a European CPF. Two different CPF
designs are compared: (1) a buyback program and (2) a top-up tax.
The buyback program sets a minimum price for the allowances from the
implementation year onwards. After the announcement, firms anticipate the
CPF, which immediately increases the carbon price to the discounted CPF level.
Therefore, firms emit less and bank more allowances, leading to more intake into
the MSR and higher cancellation volumes.
The top-up tax imposes a tax on emissions, enhancing the market price of
allowances to the CPF level from the implementation year onwards. Hence, the
top-up tax decreases the value of allowances in earlier periods, causing firms to
increase their short-run emissions in anticipation of the upcoming tax. Only after
the implementation year firms start to lower their emissions. Thus, the effect on
aggregate cancellation is ambiguous. Despite being equivalent in a static setting,
the design choice for the CPF matters in the dynamic context of the EU ETS.
When further comparing the governmental revenue within the EU ETS, it is
recognized that the total revenue rises due to the European CPF, which opens
up possibilities for compensations.
1.2.3. How Does the EU ETS Reform Impact Allowance Prices?
The Role of Myopia, Hedging Requirements and the
Hotelling Rule
Allowance prices in the EU ETS have more than quadrupled between 2013 and
2019. Prevalent literature (e.g., Chapter 2) cannot explain this sharp price in-
crease through the recent reforms. However, firms in the EU ETS are likely not
perfectly rational but they are prone to myopia and have to comply with hedg-
ing requirements. Chapter 4 includes those two forms of bounded rationality
in the Hotelling model of the reformed EU ETS, thereby explaining the market
behavior after 2013.
Due to bounded rationality, the Hotelling price path is no longer visible ex-
post even though the Hotelling price rule holds ex-ante in the decision making
of the firms. The reforms help to overcome the market distortions caused by
myopia because they decrease the short-run availability of allowances. Hedg-
ing requirements have little impact in the pre-reform market but strongly drive
market outcomes after the reform and may even cause a physical shortage of
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allowances. Neither form of bounded rationality can fully explain the market
outcomes in the EU ETS on its own. However, if myopia and hedging require-
ments are considered simultaneously, the price increase and the development of
the private bank in the EU ETS can be explained by the reforms.
1.2.4. On the Time-Dependency of MAC Curves and its
Implications for the EU ETS
The understanding of marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves is necessary for
analyses of the EU ETS. Literature commonly assumes simplified shapes of MAC
curves, as also done in the previous chapters. However, the shape of MAC curves
strongly drives the numerical results and is thus subject to research in Chapter
5.
The article conducts a case study for the European power sector and uses
a partial equilibrium model to derive two essential properties of MAC curves:
First, the shape of MAC curves is convex and depends on economic developments,
e.g., fuel prices and interest rates. Second, MAC curves flatten over time. In
the short term, fuel-switching is the only abatement option, and thus, the MAC
curve is relatively steep. With longer investment horizons, the degree of freedom
for investment grows, which flattens the MAC curve.
With convex MAC curves, marginal abatement costs in the EU ETS increase
over time, which triggers higher banking of firms compared to linear MAC curves.
In the reformed EU ETS, this comes together with higher cancellation volumes.
On the contrary, flattening MAC curves over time leads to lower incentives for
banking. Considering steeper MAC curves in the short term leads to a higher
price path and an earlier depletion of the private bank.
1.3. Methodological Approaches and Future Research
The chapters of this thesis address different research questions regarding emis-
sions trading, particularly the EU ETS. To answer the respective research ques-
tions, fundamental models of the EU ETS (Chapter 2, 3 and 4) and of European
power markets (Chapter 5) are developed and applied.
The model of the EU ETS treats emissions as a scarce and non-renewable
resource. Thus, Hotelling’s model of oil exploration can be applied to emissions
trading (Hotelling (1931)). The model assumes homogeneous firms, which face
costs for the abatement of emissions. Firms optimize themselves by banking
allowances over time to smooth the abatement path over time. The market
equilibrium is solved by implementing the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condi-
tions of the representative firm together with the rules of allowance supply in
the EU ETS. In this way, the problem formulation follows the approach of a
mixed complementary problem (MCP). In particular, the regulatory rule that
5
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borrowing of allowances from the future is not allowed translates into a com-
plementarity condition. This condition implies the extended Hotelling rule, i.e.,
allowance prices rise with the interest rate unless the aggregate private bank of
firms is empty. Further, the endogenous supply rules of the reformed EU ETS
with the MSR regulation and the cancellation mechanism constitute non-linear
conditions, which are linearized using binary variables. Overall, the model is for-
mulated as a mixed-integer problem (MIP), implemented in GAMS, and solved
with CPLEX.
Chapter 2 uses the model to analyze the cost effectiveness of the different
amendments of the EU ETS reform. This is possible as all regulatory supply
rules can be included separately in the model. Chapter 3 adds two different
CPF designs to the model of the reformed EU ETS. For the buyback design,
the CPF requires that the market price is greater or equal to the CPF level,
and the Hotelling rule does not need to hold if the market price is equal to the
CPF level. For the top-up tax design, the tax is defined as the positive part of
the difference between the CPF level and the market price. Both designs are
implemented using binary decision variables. Chapter 4 supplements the model
with the possibility of including firms’ hedging requirements by requiring that
the private bank covers a certain share of future emissions. Further, the planning
of firms is implemented with a rolling horizon approach to account for myopic
firms.
The Hotelling model assumes perfect and complete markets. As the EU ETS
is a market with European emitters and speculators, the assumption of perfect
competition seems reasonable. Also, transaction costs are relatively low because
firms can trade on a stock market. However, the tradeability and liquidity for
long-term positions of allowances are questionable. Exchange-traded futures con-
tracts mostly have a time to maturity of less than five years. Further, the interest
rate is an important driver of results. As discussed and quantified in sensitivity
analyses in Chapters 2 and 3, a lower interest rate leads to higher short-run
prices and more cancellation. Furthermore, assumptions on the abatement cost
function are necessary. Most contributions in the literature assume quadratic
abatement costs, which results in a linear MAC curve. While this assumption
simplifies the problem, it alters results in a non-realistic manner, as shown and
discussed in Chapter 5. Thus, future research should apply the stylized facts on
MAC curves to models of the EU ETS.
Moreover, Chapters 2 and 3 assume risk-neutral firms with perfect foresight.
By doing so, real market outcomes cannot be fully explained. In contrast, Chap-
ter 4 accounts for myopic firms which follow hedging strategies for risk mitigation.
In this case, the real market outcomes can be replicated better. Thus, it should
be promising to revisit the research from Chapters 2 and 3 and replace the as-
sumption of perfectly rational firms with perfect foresight by myopic firms with
hedging requirements.
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The model of the EU ETS might be useful to answer further research questions.
As currently discussed in politics, the EU ETS might be amended by other
sectors, such as the mobility, residential, or agricultural sector. Future research
could address how the market outcome and distributional aspects are affected
by new sectors. Further, models of the EU ETS could relax the assumption of
homogeneous firms. The depiction of different firms, e.g., in the power and the
industry sector, should make results more realistic. However, the derivation of
MAC curves for the industry sector seems challenging.
The last Chapter 5 uses a partial equilibrium model of the European power
markets to derive stylized facts on the shape of MAC curves. To do so, the
markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive, and firms in the market decide
under perfect foresight. While the assumption of perfect competition seems rea-
sonable for the day ahead market, the assumption of perfect foresight is critical.
The profitability of investments in new power plants depends on the economic
developments of other sectors and countries. In particular, the fuel prices are
determined on a global level and are far from perfectly foreseeable.
Besides the overview of the methodological approaches in this section, each
chapter contains a detailed description and discussion of the used methodology.
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2. The Reformed EU ETS - Intertemporal
Emission Trading with Restricted
Banking
2.1. Introduction
In 2005, the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) was intro-
duced as a cornerstone of the EU climate policy (European Parliament and the
Council of the European Union, 2003). While many regions (e.g. California,
Australia, Japan) have established other functioning carbon markets since, the
EU ETS remains the largest one yet. It covers emissions from energy-intensive
industries, the electricity sector and inner-European aviation in 31 countries and
accounts for 45% of the total EU greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
An emission allowance market coordinates abatement among firms, allocating
abatement to firms with low and allowances to firms with high abatement costs
(e.g. Tietenberg, 1985 and Salant, 2016). The environment’s capacity to absorb
emissions without harm can be thought of as a finite and hence exhaustible
resource. This is depicted in current emission trading schemes by the finite
number of emission allowances issued to the market. The well known economic
theory on exhaustible resources (e.g. oil exploration) is the model developed
by Hotelling (1931). Thereby, the market price of emission allowances develops
with the interest rate if unrestricted banking and borrowing of allowances, i.e.
saving unused allowances for the future and shifting future emissions to the
present respectively, is allowed. This enables emission markets to reach dynamic
effectiveness.
The Hotelling model was first used in the context of emission trading sys-
tems by Rubin (1996). In his seminal paper, Rubin (1996) sets up a dynamic
optimization model, where heterogeneous firms minimize their abatement costs
given predefined market rules. An intertemporal market equilibrium exists and
is cost-effective when firms minimize their costs intertemporally through bank-
ing or borrowing. However, nation states are implicitly required by international
climate agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol to refrain from allowing borrow-
ing in the design of emission trading systems (UNFCCC, 2000). The UN hereby
discourages nation states to sell future allowances and then dropping out of the
9
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agreement.1 This restriction may create short-run scarcity in the market, leading
to a deviation from the original Hotelling price path. Chevallier (2012) applies
the theoretical model developed by Rubin (1996) to the EU ETS and discusses
the impact of those restrictions on banking and borrowing given the prevailing
EU regulation at that time.
The regulatory framework of the EU ETS has been subject to multiple changes
since then. The latest major amendments have been the increase of the linear
reduction factor (LRF), the introduction of the market stability reserve (MSR)
and the option to cancel allowances from the MSR, referred to as cancellation
mechanism (CM). In October 2014, EU leaders adopted the 2030 climate and
energy framework for the European Union. This framework comprises i.a. the
target of at least 40% GHG reduction in 2030 compared to 1990 levels. To
meet this target, the annual reduction of issued allowances in the EU ETS was
increased from a LRF of 1.74% in the third trading period (2013-2020) (European
Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2003) to a LRF of 2.2% from
2021 onwards (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union,
2018).
In January 2019, the MSR came into force. Its intended effect is the strength-
ening of short-run carbon prices in the EU ETS. These were considered to not
sufficiently spur investment in low-carbon technologies due to the perceived al-
lowance surplus in phase 3 (European Parliament and the Council of the Eu-
ropean Union, 2015). The MSR is a public deposit fed with allowances from
the auction volume, whenever the number of allowances in circulation exceeds a
certain threshold (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union,
2015). From 2023 onwards, the volume of the MSR is limited to the previous
year’s auction volume. Allowances in the MSR exceeding this upper limit are
invalidated by the CM (European Parliament and the Council of the European
Union, 2018).2
Recent contributions by Richstein et al. (2015), Perino and Willner (2016) and
Beck and Kruse-Andersen (2020) evaluate the impact of the MSR on price and
emission paths. Perino and Willner (2016) and Richstein et al. (2015) find that
the MSR itself impacts the market price only temporarily and increases price
volatility, contrary to its intended purpose. Because the aggregated emission
cap is not altered, the MSR is considered allowance preserving. In Perino and
Willner (2017) the impact of an exogenous, one-time cancellation of 800 million
1Another reason for this restriction is the shape of global damage curves. Since most scholars
(e.g., Rubin, 1996) assume that pollution damage functions are convex, early emissions
cause greater environmental damage than delayed emissions, thereby requiring a limitation
on borrowing.
2This paper refrains from the fact that the European Commission and member states will
review the final cancellation of allowances (European Parliament and the Council of the
European Union, 2018) which introduces uncertainty about whether allowances will be can-
celled at all. The first review is scheduled for 2022, further reviews of the MSR and the
CM will take place in five-year intervals afterwards (European Parliament and the Council
of the European Union, 2015).
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allowances is discussed. However, the newly introduced CM decreases the over-
all emission cap endogenously, i.e. the cancellation depends on the number of
allowances in the MSR and thus on the banking decision of the firms.
The original version of the Hotelling model uses a continuous representation
of time due to the continuity of fossil fuel extraction. Continuous time models
are also used in e.g. Perino and Willner (2016) and Perino and Willner (2017).
This continuous representation of time, however, is not an accurate representa-
tion of the EU ETS with the MSR and CM. Clearing of allowances, intake and
reinjection of the MSR and the cancellation volume are determined on a yearly
basis. Consequently, this paper proposes a discrete time structure to accurately
represent current EU ETS regulation.
A discrete-time model has also been used by Beck and Kruse-Andersen (2020)
who evaluate the impact of national policies in light of the reformed EU ETS
with MSR and CM and calibrate their discrete-time models to historic market
outcomes. The authors solve iteratively a firm’s profit maximization problem
assuming quadratic abatement costs and technological progress of renewable en-
ergies. Hereby, they show that the reform of the EU ETS increases allowance
prices and decreases emissions in the short and long run. However, long-run
effects are found to be substantially higher than in the short run. Further, they
find that the effect of national policies on EU ETS emissions strongly depends
on the timing of their implementation. If national abatement measures take
place before 2023, they potentially increase the cancellation volume and thus re-
duce total EU ETS emissions.3 However, their overall evaluation of the EU ETS
amendments is ambivalent: While under the new regulation national policies
potentially have an impact on abatement within the EU ETS, the complexity
of the regulation may hinder the implementation of cost-efficient national poli-
cies. Silbye and Sørensen (2019) take a similar approach assessing the effect
of national emissions reduction in light of the latest reforms. They find that
if national emission reduction policies take place early, unused allowances will
be transferred to the MSR and partially cancelled through the CM. If national
reduction policies are implemented at a later point in time, they do not trigger
an additional MSR intake and will therefore have no lasting effects on emissions.
The contribution of the paper at hand is threefold: Firstly, we develop a
model which incorporates the current EU ETS regulation accurately, namely
the change in the LRF and the introduction of the MSR and the CM. The
volumes of the MSR and the CM are endogenously determined within a closed-
form solution. In particular, the decision algorithm of the EU ETS operates on
an annual basis. Therefore it is depicted in a discrete-time model. Secondly, the
decomposition of the recent amendments into its single components facilitates a
better understanding of the underlying economics. This allows us to identify the
main price drivers in the market. The sensitivity analysis validates the robustness
of the model results and determines which economic effects can be expected
3This effect is also found and discussed in Carlén et al. (2019).
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under various regulatory scenarios and parameter assumptions. Thirdly, the cost
effectiveness of the current EU ETS regulation is compared with theoretical first-
best scenarios based on the unaltered Hotelling model. Thereby, we can draw
conclusions on the economic implications of the different regulatory instruments
by discussing their individual impact on the economic performance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 develops the
model, including the dynamic optimization problem of the firm and the equilib-
rium conditions in a competitive market given current EU ETS regulation. In
section 2.3, the functioning of the model is explained and validated by sensitivity
analyses. Further, the underlying economic effects are decomposed. Section 2.4
discusses the implications of the three amendments individually and assesses the
cost effectiveness of the new regulation. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2. Discrete Dynamic Optimization Model
We model the decision making of N polluting firms within the intertemporal
market for emission allowances, namely the EU ETS, which is assumed to be
perfectly competitive. In the following section, we describe our model which
covers the individual decision making on the firm level. In section 2.2.2 the
market clearing and equilibrium conditions are derived from the individual op-
timality conditions. The MSR and the CM are modelled in section 2.2.3 as an
exact replication of the current EU regulation. The parameters used for the
numeric illustration are presented in section 2.2.4.
2.2.1. Decision Making of a Representative Firm
We assume a rational firm with perfect foresight which aims to minimize the






[C(e(t)) + p(t)x(t)]. (2.1)
In each discrete time period t = 0, 1, . . . , T the expenditure consists of two parts:
the abatement costs C(e(t)) and the costs of acquiring of allowances p(t)x(t).
The firm can decide on the variables e(t) for yearly emissions and x(t) for yearly
acquisition or sales of allowances. In line with Rubin (1996), we assume that the
abatement costs follow a quadratic and convex function of the form C(e(t)) =
c
2(u − e(t))
2. The counterfactual emission level u and the cost parameter c are
exogenously given. Due to the assumption of a perfectly competitive market for
allowances, the allowance price p(t) is not influenced by the individual decision
of the firm. The yearly costs are discounted at an annual interest rate of r.
Let T be the first point in time when no further allowances are issued and all
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issued allowances are depleted. Hence, for all t ≥ T an emission cap of zero is
established which makes allowance trading redundant.
As discussed in the previous section, the EU ETS enables firms to bank al-
lowances for later use. This linking between time periods is modelled with the
decision variable b(t), which is the volume of acquired allowances in the private
bank of the individual firm in period t. As intertemporal borrowing is prohibited,
we require b(t) ≥ 0. Additionally, in each time period the change in the bank
b(t) − b(t − 1) has to be equal to the difference of net acquisition of allowances
x(t) and emissions e(t).4
Combining the expenditure minimization with the intertemporal banking con-










s.t. b(t)− b(t− 1) = x(t)− e(t) for all t = 1, 2, . . . , T
b(t) ≥ 0
x(t), e(t) ≷ 0.
(2.2)
We assign the Lagrange multipliers λ(t) and µb(t) to the flow constraint and
the positivity constraint, respectively. As the optimization problem is convex
and fulfills the Slater condition, the KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient
for optimality.5 These imply that µb(t) is 0 if b(t) is positive.
From the optimality conditions we get
c(u− e(t)) = p(t). (2.3)
This states that the firm will set emissions e(t) such that the marginal abate-
ment costs equal the price p(t). Economically speaking, the firm expands emis-
sions e(t) and acquires allowances x(t) whenever the allowance price is below
the marginal abatement cost. Contrary, the firm abates more emissions if the
allowance price exceeds the marginal abatement costs.
2.2.2. Market Equilibrium
While the firm’s demand for allowances solely depends on the optimization prob-
lem stated above, the price is determined by the market. Supply, i.e. issuance
of allowances, and demand, i.e. the firm’s acquisition of allowances, have to be
balanced by the price, such that the market clears.
4We formally allow emissions to be negative. However, as borrowing is not allowed in the
model, negative emissions do not occur.
5See Appendix A.1 for details on the Lagrange function and the exact KKT conditions in-
cluding complementary conditions.
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We define the supply S(t) as the path of issued allowances in period t, which
is regulated to be decreasing from an initial value S(0) at a linear rate a(t),
hence S(t) = S(t − 1) − a(t)S0.6 The issued allowances are partially auctioned
(Sauct(t)) and partially distributed for free.
7
The price path p(t) is determined in the market such that aggregated emissions






S(t̃) for all t = 0, 1, . . . , T.
We assume that firms are homogeneous. From the individual optimality con-




= r − (1 + r)t+1µb(t)
p(t)
. (2.4)
Economically speaking, whenever the private bank b(t) > 0, the corresponding
shadow costs are µb(t) = 0 and hence the price rises with interest rate r. This is
in line with the continuous model in Hotelling (1931), where the optimal emission
path can be achieved if banking and borrowing is possible. If at some point in
time τb=0 the bank becomes 0, firms would implicitly like to borrow allowances
from the future, which is forbidden by EU regulation.8 Therefore, firms have to
abate more than in the optimal emission abatement path before τb=0. This in
turn means that the firm abates less than in the optimal abatement path after
τb=0. Consequently, the price will increase at a lower rate than r after τb=0.
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2.2.3. Introduction of the MSR and the CM
With the introduction of the MSR and the CM the supply of allowances is
no longer exogenously determined by the regulator. The amount of auctioned
allowances Sauct(t) additionally depends on the banking decisions of individual
firms. To depict the development of the allowance supply correctly, we define
the total number of allowances in circulation TNAC(t) =
∑N
i=1 bi(t), where bi
represents the individual banking decision of firm i.
The MSR mechanism works as follows: If at some time t the TNAC(t) exceeds
an upper limit `up, the number of auctioned allowances will be reduced by a share
γ(t) of the TNAC of the previous year. This reduction of auctioned allowances is
6S0 represents the number of allowances in 2010. a(t) is the LRF.
7Following EU Directive 2018/410 the share of auctioned allowances is 57%, i.e. Sauct(t) =
0.57S(t).
8We disregard the unlikely case that it could be possible that the path of issued allowances
coincides with the optimal emission path. Hence, the bank would be 0 for all t.
9If at a later point in time a second banking phase occurs, the Hotelling rule becomes valid
again.
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inserted into the MSR. If TNAC(t) drops below a lower limit `low, R allowances
from the MSR are auctioned additionally.10
The CM states that allowances will be cancelled from the MSR, i.e. become
invalid if the number of allowances in the MSR exceeds the auction volume of
the previous year (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union,
2018).
These two amendments to the EU ETS are accurately expressed by
S(t) = S(t− 1)− a(t)S0 − Intake(t) +Reinjection(t). (2.5)
The MSR is then given by









R if TNAC(t− 1) < `low ∧MSR(t) ≥ R,






MSR(t)− Sauct(t− 1) if MSR(t) ≥ Sauct(t− 1),
0 otherwise.
(2.9)
2.2.4. Model Implementation and Parametrization
The regulatory decision rules and complementary conditions stated are non-
linear. For the implementation and solution of the model with GAMS and
CPLEX, they are equivalently reformulated as linear constraints using binary
variables and the big-M method. This allows to combine the exact regulatory
rules of the EU ETS with the market equilibrium model derived by the optimality
conditions of the firms in an mixed-integer linear program.
In 2019, the MSR is initially endowed with 900 million allowances which were
backloaded between 2014 and 2016 (European Parliament and the Council of the
European Union, 2015). Further, allowances that will remain unallocated at the
10This regulation started in 2019 with an upper limit `up of 833 million and a lower limit `low
of 400 million allowances. The intake rate γ(t) into the MSR is 24% of the TNAC until 2024
and 12% afterwards. The reinjection takes place at tranches R of 100 million allowances
(European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2015).
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end of phase 3 of the EU ETS are transferred into the MSR in 2020. These are
estimated to amount to 600 million allowances (European Commission, 2015). As
initial value for the TNAC in 2017 we use 1645 million allowances as published by
the European Commission (2018). The number of issued allowances is calculated
based on the 2199 million allowances issued in 2010 (European Environmental
Agency, 2018) and reduced on a yearly basis by the corresponding LRF.11
Apart from the above mentioned regulatory parameters, the model is fed with
further exogenous parameters, namely the interest rate, the counterfactual emis-
sions and the backstop costs. In section 2.3.2 we discuss how the choice of these
parameter values impacts the results. If not stated otherwise, the following val-
ues are used in the model: We apply a private interest rate r of 8%, representing
the approximated weighted average cost of capital (WACC) of fossil power plants
(Kost et al., 2018) and energy-intensive industries (KPMG, 2017). We acknowl-
edge that there is high uncertainty about the counterfactual emission level in the
absence of a cap-and-trade system e.g. because of technology advancement (Beck
and Kruse-Andersen, 2020), economic activity and weather conditions (Boren-
stein et al., 2019). For the sake of simplicity, we assume constant counterfactual
emissions u of 2000 million tonnes CO2 equivalent (CO2e).
12
We think of the backstop costs as the costs associated with a costly but in-
exhaustible abatement option, e.g. direct air carbon capture and storage. As-
suming backstop costs c of 150 EUR/t13, the cost parameter c is calculated by
c := c/u. By this definition we ensure that the last ton of counterfactual emis-
sions is abated at backstop costs, i.e. for our quadratic abatement cost function
C ′(0) = c̄.
2.3. Results and Sensitivity Analysis
With the parametrized model set up above, we are able to assess the develop-
ment of emissions, prices and MSR movements under the current regulation.
Robustness of our results in terms of the parametrization is guaranteed by an
extensive sensitivity analysis in section 2.3.2.
11In our model we assume that without the reform the LRF of 1.74% would have been contin-
uously used. However, the LRF for the time after 2020 had not been defined yet. Likewise,
we assume that the increased LRF the factor of 2.2% will be used for all future trading
periods. (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2018)
12This assumption is similar to Perino and Willner (2016) and Schopp et al. (2015) who use
constant counterfactual emissions of 1900 million tonnes CO2e and 2200 million tonnes
CO2e, respectively. The sensitivity of this assumption is calculated and further discussed
in section 2.3.2.
13The backstop costs of 150 EUR/t are in line with medium-range predictions of common
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technologies (e.g. Saygin et al., 2012 and Kuramochi
et al., 2012).
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2.3.1. Results Under Current Regulation
From Equation 2.4 we know that as long as banking occurs, which is the case as
long as sufficient allowances are available, the allowance price increases at the rate
of interest (in accordance with the Hotelling rule). Under the current regulation,
this development of abatement, emissions and the allowance price takes place
until the TNAC is depleted in 2039, as depicted in Figure 2.1. Thereafter,
annual emissions equal the number of issued allowances, which decline with the
LRF. The allowance price increases at a lower, degressive rate, because marginal
abatement costs equal prices (Equation 2.3). When all allowances are used,
emissions drop to zero, and the allowance price reaches the marginal costs of
the backstop technology (150 EUR/t)14 and remains at this upper limit. This
happens from 2058 onwards.
Figure 2.1.: Development of emissions, TNAC, MSR, cancellation volumes and allowance
prices
After the implementation of the MSR in 2019, allowances are inserted into the
MSR based on the rules described in 2.2.3 since the TNAC exceeds the limit
of 833 million allowances (see Figure 2.1). Until 2023, the MSR accumulates
2762 million allowances. As the CM enters into force in 2023, allowances be-
come invalid according to the rules described in 2.2.3. This leads to a one-time
14EU ETS regulation imposes a penalty of 100 EUR/t (inflation-adjusted) if firms are non-
compliant. The penalty does not release firms from their obligation to surrender allowances
(European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2003). Therefore, paying
the penalty fee is never a rational outcome, independent of the backstop price level.
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cancellation of 2002 million allowances in 2023.15 This is equivalent to about
5% of all issued allowances from 2018 onwards. In 2028, the TNAC drops below
the threshold of 400 million. Thus, from 2029 until the depletion of the MSR in
2037, 760 million allowances are reinjected into the market.
2.3.2. Sensitivity Analysis
As discussed in section 2.2.4, the model uses three exogenous input parame-
ters: backstop costs, counterfactual emissions and interest rate. Varying these
parameters does not change the modus operandi of the model. However, the
numerical results are influenced by the assumed parameter values. Therefore, in
the following we carry out sensitivity analyses to carve out robust results.
Backstop costs
Due to the uncertainty when it comes to the realization of specific backstop costs
in the future, we analyze its impact in a sensitivity. Ceteris paribus (in partic-
ular for a given level of counterfactual emissions u), a change in backstop costs
only shifts the price path, but does not affect the level of emissions, abatement,
TNAC, MSR or cancellation. In particular, the point in time at which the TNAC
is depleted does not change. This is because the initial quantities still fulfill all
equilibrium and regulatory conditions from section 2.2 for a scaled version of the
price path. We state and prove this finding formally in Appendix A.2.
Counterfactual Emissions
Since it is not possible to measure counterfactual emissions, it is essential to take
the uncertainty regarding this parameter into account (Borenstein et al., 2019).
As the choice of its level has a significant impact on the numerical model results,
a sensitivity analysis helps to assess the range of potential outcomes.
If we assume higher counterfactual emissions then in the standard case from
2.3.1, the firm has higher emissions and correspondingly lower banking early
on (see Figure 2.2). Since this behavior drives allowance prices up, the firm
increases abatement, partially compensating the effect of higher counterfactual
emissions. However, the overall effect on banking remains negative. An increase
of counterfactual emissions from 2000 to 2200 million tonnes CO2e depletes the
TNAC four years earlier. By regulation, the decrease of the TNAC leads to
a lower intake of allowances into the MSR. Therefore, higher counterfactual
emissions have a twofold negative effect on cancellation: Firstly, the lower MSR
intake leads to a lower MSR volume. Secondly, it results in a larger auction
volume as the MSR intake is subtracted from the allowances to be auctioned.
15In this setting cancellation only takes place once. However, this is not inevitable and depends
on the parametrization. Thus, multiple cancellation phases are possible.
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Additionally, higher counterfactual emissions require stronger abatement to meet
the same emission target. Thus, at any time t, allowance prices are above the
ones in the standard case. An increase in counterfactual emissions from 2000 to
2200 million tonnes CO2e leads to a price increase by 22% in all years in which
the Hotelling rule applies.
Figure 2.2.: Sensitivity analysis for counterfactual emissions
Vice versa, lower counterfactual emissions lead to lower prices, higher TNAC
levels and therefore higher intake into the MSR and larger cancellation volumes.
Further, TNAC and MSR deplete at a later point in time. However, changes in
the counterfactual emissions impact quantities asymmetrically. If the counter-
factual emissions lie for instance at 1800 instead of 2000 million tonnes CO2e,
about 900 million allowances are cancelled additionally, whereas about 600 mil-
lion allowances are cancelled additionally if the counterfactual emissions lie at
2000 instead of 2200 million tonnes CO2e.
Figure 2.3 assesses the impact of counterfactual emissions on the aggregated
amount of allowances cancelled. The cancellation volume increases overpropor-
tionally with a decrease of counterfactual emissions. In other words, with low
counterfactual emissions, the model reaches higher levels of cancelled allowances.
The higher the counterfactual emissions, the faster the private bank is depleted
and thus the lower the MSR and the cancellation volume.
Over time declining counterfactual emissions (as assumed by e.g. Carlén et al.,
2019 and Quemin and Trotignon, 2018) require lower abatement efforts. Hence,
prices are strictly lower, leading to higher emissions and a lower TNAC in the
short run and less cancellation in 2023. As the TNAC and the MSR deplete later,
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Figure 2.3.: Effect of counterfactual emissions on cancellation
emission levels in the long run are higher compared to the case with constant
counterfactual emissions.
Interest rate
The interest rate of a firm reflects the opportunity costs of abatement, i.e. the
profitability of alternative investments. Therefore, the interest rate impacts the
firm’s abatement decision directly. Thereby, the emission path and banking
decision is affected, finally having an impact even on the MSR and the CM.
Figure 2.4 shows the sensitivity of the model results for interest rates of 3%,
5%, 8% and 16%. With a higher interest rate, the initial price level is lower but
increases at a higher rate afterwards. Consequently, firms prefer to delay abate-
ment and therefore increase emissions in the short run. With a similar rationale
as in the sensitivity with higher counterfactual emissions, a higher interest rate
leads to fewer MSR intake and less cancellation due to higher emissions in the
short run.
In consequence, abatement has to be higher in the medium run to compensate
for the initially higher emissions. In our example in Figure 2.4, starting with
the depletion of the TNAC in 2030, the emissions in the sensitivity with 16%
interest rate are lower than in the standard case with 8%. In the long run after
2040, emissions equal the exogenous supply of allowances in both cases. Hence,
the price development is independent of the interest rate.16
With a lower interest rate, we can observe the opposite effects. Prices start
at a higher level but increase at a lower rate. Emissions decrease in the short
run and increase in later periods. A higher TNAC leads to more intake into the
MSR and a higher volume of aggregate cancellation. In particular, with a lower
interest rate the TNAC is non-empty for a longer time period, which in turn
16In both cases the reinjection of allowances from the MSR ends before 2040.
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Figure 2.4.: Sensitivity analysis for the interest rate
causes the price to longer rise with the interest rate. With an interest rate of
3%, the price rises with the interest rate until 2057.
Figure 2.5.: Effect of interest rate on cancellation
Figure 2.5 assesses the impact of the interest rate on the total amount of
allowances cancelled. Note that the aggregated cancellation volume and therefore
the total abatement only changes significantly for low interest rates. The total
number of cancelled allowances cannot fall below a certain level, because the
emission level is bounded by the counterfactual emissions. In other words, the
quantity of allowances needed in the short run is limited and therefore some
amount of cancellation takes place independent of the interest rate.
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Two effects determine the relationship between interest rate and cancellation
volume: First, a high interest rate leads to higher emissions and less MSR intake
in the short run. Therefore, the cancellation volume in 2023 decreases with the
interest rate. Second, as total abatement does not change significantly, a high
interest rate leads to higher abatement and a higher TNAC in the medium run,
potentially causing more cancellation after 2023. The second effect partially
offsets the first effect in terms of the total volume of allowances cancelled.
A high interest rate of firms leads to lower cancellation volumes. Since greater
uncertainty in the market is reflected by higher interest rates of market partici-
pants, we conclude that the higher the uncertainty perceived in the market, the
weaker the impact of the CM.
2.3.3. Results in the Context of Previous Studies
In the following, we put the findings presented in section 2.3.1 in the context
of previous studies. Silbye and Sørensen (2019) and Beck and Kruse-Andersen
(2020) find that in addition to the cancellation in 2023, further allowances are
cancelled during the following years, leading to cumulative cancellation volumes
of 5000 million (Silbye and Sørensen, 2019) and 6000 million (Beck and Kruse-
Andersen, 2020). The significantly larger cancellation volumes compared to our
result can be explained by the underlying model and parameter assumptions:
Both studies assume a lower initial counterfactual emission level which is more-
over decreasing over time. 17 As discussed in section 2.3.2, lower counterfac-
tual emissions cause the TNAC and the MSR to deplete later (e.g. Silbye and
Sørensen (2019) find that the TNAC depletes in 2057, while our model suggests
a depletion in 2039) and a larger cancellation volume. Another reason for higher
cancellation volumes in Beck and Kruse-Andersen (2020) lies in their assumption
of a convex marginal abatement cost curve. Compared to a linear curvature, the
convexity assumption increases the TNAC and hence cancellation volumes. Fur-
ther, Silbye and Sørensen (2019) calibrate their model to depict the price spike
in 2018 by the assumption of a decrease in interest rate caused by the reform.
They assume a demand elasticity that translates to a significantly higher back-
stop cost level than in our model.18 While the backstop price itself does not
influence banking behavior and cancellation volume (see section 2.3.2), it leads
to a higher overall price level.
Despite the different modelling approaches, our numerical results are in line
with the findings of Carlén et al. (2019) and Perino and Willner (2017). With
their iterative solution approach, Carlén et al. (2019) find a one-time cancellation
17Their assumption of decreasing counterfactual emissions implies decreasing backstop costs
given that the cost parameter is held constant.
18Their sensitivity parameter of allowance demand of 2.2 corresponds to an initial backstop
cost level of 760 EUR/t. In other words, the initial cost parameter c implied by Silbye and
Sørensen (2019) is nine times larger than the one used in Perino and Willner (2017) and six
times larger than the one used in our model.
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of 2400 million allowances in 2023. The TNAC is depleted in 2034 and the MSR
is empty in 2035. Their slightly higher cancellation volume can be explained by
their lower interest rate of 2.5% (see section 2.3.2). One of the scenarios from
Perino and Willner (2017) depicts a MSR limited by the auction volume. With
assumptions on counterfactual emissions and interest rate close to ours, their
results are similar: Their TNAC is depleted in 2037 and their MSR remains
empty from 2036 onwards. Thus, despite different modelling approaches, our
numerical results (cancellation volume of 2000 million allowances, MSR depletion
in 2037 and TNAC depletion in 2039) are in line with those of the two former
studies.
2.4. Impact of the EU ETS Amendments on
Emissions, Prices and Economic Performance
We assess the impact of the recent EU ETS amendments on abatement paths,
total emissions and price paths. The results of the EU ETS reforms presented in
section 2.3.1 are decomposed into the effects of single amendments, namely the
increase in the LRF, the MSR and the CM (section 2.4.1). In section 2.4.2 we
evaluate the economic performance of the amendments by comparing the single
amendments to hypothetical first-best scenarios with the respective emission cap.
Table 2.1 depicts the characteristics of the different scenarios used in this section.
LRF after 2020 MSR CM
pre-reform 1.74% no no
increased LRF 2.20% no no
MSR 2.20% yes no
post-reform 2.20% yes yes
late cancel 2.20% yes
cancellation from
the long end
Table 2.1.: Overview of examined scenarios
2.4.1. Decomposition of Effects of the Recent EU ETS
Amendments on Prices and Emissions
Apart from the pre-reform scenario and the post-reform scenario that depicts
the current EU ETS regulations discussed in section 2.3, we set up the increased
LRF scenario (high LRF from 2021 onwards, but no MSR and CM) to isolate
the impact of the increased LRF from the aggregated reform results (see Figure
2.6). The results show that the effect of the lower cap on issued allowances is
significant: with the higher LRF of 2.2% the total emission cap is reduced by
over 9 billion allowances which equals a 21% reduction of the allowance volume
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issued after 2020. The last allowances will be issued in 2057 and thus 10 years
earlier than with the lower LRF.
This additional scarcity also shows in the price difference between the pre-
reform scenario and the increased LRF scenario. The higher LRF increases
prices at any point in time but the difference is most noticeable in the long
run. The change in the LRF does not impact the banking decision of the firm,
and thus at which time τb=0 the TNAC becomes zero and prices develop at a
degressive rate. As the price level at time τb=0 is higher in the increased LRF
scenario, the degressive price path after this point develops from a higher level
and at a higher rate. Thus, the price increase resulting from the change in the
LRF is most significant in the long run.
Figure 2.6.: Effect of the change in the LRF
Now, we isolate the effect of the MSR from the change in the LRF, by compar-
ing the introduction of the MSR with the increased LRF scenario. By regulation,
the MSR only shifts emissions from the present to the future and thus can be
considered an intertemporal smoothing of abatement. This results from stor-
ing allowances in the MSR and limiting today’s allowance supply, reinforcing
abatement in the near future and decreasing abatement later on.
While the intake of allowances in the MSR leads to higher prices in the short
run, the reinjection phase reverses this effect in the long run by increasing the
auction volume in tranches of 100 million allowances annually compared to the
increased LRF scenario. (Figure 2.7). Thus, the MSR remains allowance pre-
serving and does not alter the emission cap itself. This is in line with the findings
of e.g. Perino and Willner (2016) and Richstein et al. (2015).
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Figure 2.7.: Effect of the MSR and the CM
In contrast, the CM alters the overall emission cap. Thus, fewer allowances
are available in the post-reform scenario (including the CM) than in the MSR
and increased LRF scenarios. The firms take this into account and choose an
emissions path that is slightly lower in the post-reform scenario. Therefore, the
overall intake into the MSR is slightly higher than in the MSR scenario. About
2000 million allowances are cancelled in 2023 and the remaining 760 million
allowances in the MSR are reinjected into the market from 2029 onwards. The
MSR is fully depleted in 2037, i.e. 19 years earlier than in the scenario without
the CM. Compared to this MSR scenario, the model reveals only minor price
effects of the cancellation in the short term (e.g. 3% price difference in 2030).
However, the price difference becomes larger once the MSR is fully depleted in
the post-reform scenario and the cancellation causes additional scarcity in the
market (e.g. 8.5% price difference in 2040). This finding indicates that while
the cancellation takes place at an early time, prices are more affected in the long
run.
Conversely, the difference in prices between the increased LRF scenario and
the post-reform scenario can only be observed in the short and medium run.
Due to the reduced cap and thus additional scarcity in the market, the TNAC
depletes at an earlier time τb=0.
19 Because the MSR is depleted once the TNAC
falls below the limit `low, the change in the LRF is the only determining factor
causing the higher price path compared to the pre-reform scenario in the long
run.
19In the increased LRF scenario τb=0 = 2042. This is 4 years later than in the post-reform
scenario.
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The cancellation volume of 2 billion allowances is significantly smaller than
the reduction of 9 billion allowances by the increased LRF.20 Even though the
effect of an increased LRF seems to be well understood by scholars and thus has
not been a focus of previous studies, it is important to stress that the increased
LRF is the main price driver of the reform. 21
2.4.2. Cost Effectiveness
In the following, we assess the impact of the reform on the intertemporal eco-
nomic performance of the EU ETS. Fuss et al. (2018) differentiate between two
frameworks for its assessment: Dynamic cost efficiency and dynamic cost ef-
fectiveness. Dynamically efficient policies maximize welfare by minimizing the
social cost of emission abatement and damages. Those damage costs are com-
monly referred to as social costs of carbon (SCC). Since the SCC strongly vary
with location, time preferences and other underlying factors, the estimates de-
picted in literature cover a broad range of potential values. Tol (2019) estimates
today’s global SCC to range from 14 EUR/t carbon to 55 EUR/t carbon, Cai
and Lontzek (2019) argue that the SCC can raise to as much as 667 EUR/t
carbon by 2100. Given the high uncertainty regarding the SCC and its impor-
tance for determining cost efficiency, we follow Fuss et al. (2018) by refraining
from using this framework and instead focus on the concept of dynamic cost
effectiveness. This framework assesses whether predefined quantity targets are
reached by the lowest aggregated abatement costs without further consideration
of external costs of emissions. The design of the EU ETS itself targets cost ef-
fectiveness. Allowance supply is predefined such that the system only minimizes
the abatement costs.22
Figure 2.8 gives an overview of discounted abatement costs and emission lev-
els of the different scenarios. The cost-effective frontier depicts the minimal
discounted abatement costs for the respective emission level. This is achieved by
a hypothetical scenario in which firms can allocate allowances in time without
any intertemporal restriction. The discounted abatement costs are normalized
to the discounted abatement costs of the cost-effective abatement path for the
emission level where the post-reform allowance supply is fully exploited.
20This finding is also depicted in Appendix A.3 where we compare the effect of the CM in the
post-reform scenario with a post-reform scenario with the pre-reform LRF of 1.74%.
21A survey conducted in 2018 revealed that there are common misconceptions about the main
price driver of the reform. Experts from the field expressed their intuition about the main
price driver of the allowance price. Only 21% of the respondents named the increased LRF
as the main reason for the price increase, while 34 % considered the CM as the main price
driver (see Wölfling and Germeshausen, 2019).
22A cost-efficient policy ensures that marginal abatement costs are equal to marginal social
costs of carbon at each point of time (compare Fuss et al., 2018).
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Figure 2.8.: Comparison of discounted abatement costs and emission levels in different
scenarios
In general, all scenarios lie above the cost-effective frontier, i.e. firms can-
not realize the cost-effective abatement path due to time-restricted availability
of allowances. The time restriction on allowance availability is due to the non-
borrowing constraint, the issue path of allowances and the temporal shifting of
allowances through the MSR. Further, due to the underlying quadratic abate-
ment cost function the curvature of the cost-effective frontier is convex. Higher
abatement, leading to lower emissions, is disproportionately cost-intensive.
Comparing the pre-reform scenario (with unrestricted banking and no possi-
bility to borrow) with a LRF of 1.74% and 2.2%, we see that increasing the LRF
has a strong effect on the level of emissions, as also discussed in section 2.4.1.
At the same time, increasing the LRF closes the gap between the cost-effective
frontier and the discounted abatement costs. Increasing the LRF reduces the
allowance supply - in particular in later periods - and hence diminishes the addi-
tional costs imposed by the non-borrowing constraint since fewer allowances can
be borrowed from the future.
The MSR scenario adds a restriction on banking without changing the emission
level (since the CM is not active in this scenario). It weakens cost effectiveness
by shifting emissions into the future, antagonistic to firms’ time preferences.
The CM invalidates about 2 billion allowances in 2023, cutting allowances by
approximately 5% of allowances issued after 2017. Counterintuitively, this is not
an instantaneous cancellation of allowances early on, but rather a reduction of
future allowance supply since it eliminates reinjection from the MSR into the
market in later periods (compare 2.4.1). The cancellation changes little in the
short-term abatement, impacting mainly the allowances available in later periods
where the shadow costs of the non-borrowing constraint are rather low. Hence,
the introduction of the CM slightly reduces the gap to the cost-effective frontier
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(+3.2%-points in the MSR scenario, +3%-points in the post-reform scenario).
The discounted abatement costs increase due to the introduction of the CM
according to the additional costs of tightening the emission budget.
To assess the cost effectiveness of the post-reform scenario, an alternative de-
sign of the CM is considered: In the late cancel scenario the cancellation is im-
plemented by cutting the allowance supply from the long end, leaving allowances
in the MSR unaffected, instead of instantaneously reducing the volume of the
MSR in the post-reform scenario.23 By construction, cost effectiveness in the
late cancel scenario improves compared to the post-reform scenario.
As stated before, in the post-reform scenario the allowance supply is reduced
by a shortening of the reinjection phase. In contrast, in the late cancel scenario
the reinjection phase lasts longer, leading to more available allowances before
2050. Instead, the allowance supply is reduced from the very end and thus the
last allowance is issued earlier than in the post-reform scenario. Hence, the alter-
native cancellation design enables firms to use the allowances more flexibly over
time and to partly harmonize their abatement path with their time preferences.
Making the reinjection rate more flexible, e.g. by defining it as share of the
previous years emission level or by increasing its value in early periods could
further boost dynamic cost effectiveness, and may contribute to making the EU
ETS more resilient towards demand shocks, which Perino and Willner (2016)
identified as a drawback of the MSR.
Further, our theoretical evaluation of cost effectiveness neglects spillover ef-
fects. The price increase caused by the reform may trigger short-term invest-
ments into low-emission technologies which lower the costs for future abatement
due to technological learning. Since firms do not internalize those spillover ef-
fects, the reform may induce benefits for cost effectiveness not accounted for in
our model.
2.5. Conclusion
With the change of the linear reduction factor, the implementation of the market
stability reserve and the introduction of the cancellation mechanism, the EU ETS
changed fundamentally. This paper developed a discrete dynamic optimization
model reflecting firms’ optimal choice of abatement under the new regulation.
The results for the post-reform scenario including all three amendments show
that about 5% of allowances issued from 2018 onwards are invalidated through
a one-time cancellation in 2023. All remaining allowances in the MSR are rein-
jected into the market from 2029 to 2036. The assumed backstop costs of 150
EUR/t are reached in 2057. The level of the backstop costs solely scales the




price path, but does not further impact the resulting quantities. Counterfactual
emissions in absence of the EU ETS can only be estimated with significant uncer-
tainty, but the assumption strongly drives model results. Higher counterfactual
emissions increase emissions, abatement and prices and diminish the impact of
the MSR and the CM.
Varying the interest rate has a similar effect. If firms have higher private in-
terest rates, they choose to delay abatement and increase emissions in the short
run, leading to a smaller MSR intake and cancellation volume. This extensive
sensitivity analysis of the underlying parameter assumptions proved the robust-
ness of the model results. While the choice of the parameter values influences the
numeric results of the model, it does not impact the underlying modus operandi.
By decomposing the reform into its single amendments, we evaluate the eco-
nomic impact and the dynamic cost effectiveness of these amendments individ-
ually. In the increased LRF scenario, we showed that with the higher reduction
factor of 2.2% the total emission cap is reduced by over 9 billion allowances, and
thus increases prices in the short and long run. We identify the change in the
LRF as the main driver of change in the post-reform EU ETS. The MSR itself
shifts emissions from the present to the future. This does not impact the overall
emission cap, but adds a restriction on banking and thus deteriorates dynamic
efficiency.
The CM changes little in the short run, but mainly reduces the available num-
ber of allowances in the long run by about 2 billion. Further, we show that an
alternative cancellation of allowances from the long end increases the cost effec-
tiveness within the model. Nevertheless, the MSR increases abatement costs for
firms by shifting additional abatement to earlier periods and increasing emis-
sions later on. The initial goal of the reform was to increase today’s prices and
thereby a signal to invest in low-carbon technology. We find that the intended
effect of the introduction of the MSR with CM does not correspond to the design
chosen by policy makers which impacts prices and emissions mostly in the long
run. To increase the resilience of the EU ETS towards demand shocks and to
avoid additional abatement costs stemming from the MSR, a more flexible rein-
jection rate should be considered by policy makers. Future research should take
positive externalities, e.g. learning effects of abatement technologies or other
spillover effects, into account which may enhance the advantages of the MSR.
The price increase in the real EU ETS in the aftermath of the reform cannot be
explained by the model presented in the paper. This might be due to the fact that
the assumptions of a competitive market with perfectly rational firms that op-
timize themselves under perfect foresight are violated in reality. Several market
imperfections might exist that could lead to a deviation from those assumptions:
Hedging requirements may for example lead to higher banking volumes inde-
pendent of market prices. Therefore, the price increase in the aftermath of the
current reform may be underestimated by our model. Further, it is possible that
firms are myopic and only optimize themselves over the next few years instead
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of the long run. Thus, firms do not anticipate that allowances in the MSR will
become available in the future but rather see the significant short-term cut in
allowance supply induced by the reform. This leads to a stronger price increase
due to the reform than in the perfect foresight case. Moreover, firms might face
uncertainty regarding regulatory reforms. If firms perceive the recent reforms as
a signal for increasing scarcity of allowances in the future, they purchase more
allowances today, amplifying the price increase of the reform. We therefore argue
that the price spike in 2018 is not solely driven by the new regulation but po-
tentially intensified by regulatory uncertainty and bounded rationality, such as
myopia and hedging requirements. Thus, further research should evaluate such
market imperfections.
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3.1. Introduction
Since its implementation in 2005, the European Emissions Trading System (EU
ETS) has been the world’s largest cap-and-trade system accounting for emissions
in the energy sector, energy-intensive industries, and intra-European aviation.
As a quantity-based instrument, it sets an allowance cap with annually declining
volumes. In this way, the EU ETS defines a fixed carbon budget for all firms
under its regulation. The price for allowances is determined in auctions and
secondary markets. Theoretically, this mechanism ensures that the predefined
abatement target is achieved cost-efficiently.
From 2012 to 2017, the market price for allowances in the EU ETS has re-
mained below 10 EUR/t. Since this price level has been perceived as too low to
spur investments in long-term abatement technologies, a European carbon price
floor (CPF), which imposes a minimum price for the allowances, has been pro-
posed. In theory, such a complementary price instrument strengthens the relia-
bility of cap-and-trade systems and the profitability of investments in abatement
technologies (Flachsland et al., 2020). In practice, the discussion over the intro-
duction of a CPF has remained informal. Instead of implementing a CPF, the
European Commission has introduced quantity-based instruments, namely the
market stability reserve (MSR) in 2015 and the cancellation mechanism in 2018.
If firms hold more than a predefined amount of allowances in their accounts,
the supply of allowances for the following year is reduced, and the respective
allowances are stored in the MSR. The cancellation mechanism invalidates al-
lowances if the MSR volume exceeds the previous year’s auction volume.
Nevertheless, the introduction of a European CPF is still under discussion
and offers further improvements to the reformed EU ETS. Firstly, a European
CPF stabilizes allowance prices and, therefore, decreases the price risk for in-
vestors. While allowance prices have risen to over 25 EUR/t in 2019, the stabil-
ity of higher price levels remains unknown. For example, during the COVID-19
pandemic, the price of allowances has temporarily experienced a sharp decline.
Moreover, Quemin (2020) indicates that the robustness of the reformed EU ETS
towards demand shocks remains limited. Secondly, a European CPF strength-
ens the case for national policies in the EU ETS sectors. To achieve national
abatement targets, many countries favor national policies such as renewable en-
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ergy subsidies, coal phase-outs, and national CPFs.24 Those unilateral policies
can cause a waterbed effect, i.e., depress the carbon price in the EU ETS (e.g.,
Fischer et al. (2019)). A European CPF helps to diminish this waterbed effect
but also causes distributional effects between member states, which impedes a
unanimous agreement.25 Thirdly, a European CPF is a valid instrument to im-
plement tighter European emission targets, which are currently under discussion.
The CPF sets an incentive to raise overall abatement efforts by increasing the
costs of emissions. An opportunity to introduce a European CPF may arise after
the review of the reformed EU ETS in 2023.
This article contributes to the existing literature by examining the impact of
a European CPF in the reformed EU ETS. It analyzes two different designs of
the CPF - a governmental buyback and a top-up tax - and their interaction with
the MSR and the cancellation mechanism. For the analysis, the model in this
article builds on Bocklet et al. (2019), who add the cancellation mechanism to
a discretized version of the model in Perino and Willner (2016), which applies
the seminal contribution of Hotelling (1931) to intertemporal allowance trading
in the reformed EU ETS. The model depicts the market-clearing and equilib-
rium conditions and the exact replication of the current EU ETS regulations,
particularly the MSR and cancellation mechanism.
The implementation of the different CPF designs yields the following findings:
Once announced, the buyback design becomes effective instantaneously as firms
incorporate the discounted CPF level in their decision-making. Firms imme-
diately reduce their emissions, and overall emissions are reduced through the
MSR and cancellation mechanism. On the contrary, the top-up tax decreases
the value of allowances in earlier periods, causing firms to raise their emissions
in anticipation of the upcoming tax. Only after the implementation year, firms
start to lower their emissions. Thus, the effect of the top-up tax on aggregate
cancellation is ambiguous and depends on the CPF level and the implementation
year. For both CPF designs, the aggregate cancellation increases with the CPF
level and decreases with its implementation year.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 gives an
overview of the literature on a CPF in emissions trading systems. Section 3.3 in-
troduces the discrete-time Hotelling model of the reformed EU ETS. The model
formulation is further extended by different designs of the CPF, namely a buy-
back of allowances and a top-up tax. Section 3.4 analyzes the impact of the
different designs of the European CPF on market outcomes, such as allowance
prices, banking, cancellation volumes, and governmental revenue. In particular,
24At least for the power sector, many countries and companies are in favor of a CPF (Appunn
and Egenter, 2018 and Simon, 2018). Even the German government has started to support
a CPF after recent discussions on the achievement of national climate targets (Bundesminis-
terium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und nukleare Sicherheit, 2019 and Edenhofer et al., 2019).
25For example, low-emission installations such as French nuclear power plants could benefit,
whereas high-emission installations such as German coal-fired power plants could face losses
(Newbery et al., 2019).
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the influence of the CPF level and its implementation year on the aggregate
emission level is examined. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2. Literature on the CPF and its Design Options
The literature on cap-and-trade systems with a price instrument builds on the
seminal work of Roberts and Spence (1976). They show that under uncertainty,
abatement is efficiently allocated amongst firms if they are regulated by a com-
bination of price and quantity instruments. Contributions by Burtraw et al.
(2010), Wood and Jotzo (2011), Abrell and Rausch (2017), and Burtraw et al.
(2018) suggest that complementing a cap-and-trade system with price regulation
helps to overcome the uncertainty of marginal abatement costs. Besides, the an-
ticipation of the price regulation plays an important role. Friesen et al. (2020)
recognize that the price levels chosen by the regulator act as focal points influ-
encing the market price for allowances. A CPF below the expected price level
can also incentivize investment in abatement technology if it reduces the price
risk in the market. Salant et al. (2020) further observe that a soft price floor
below the expected price level is effective in a stochastic model with demand
shocks (“action at a distance”).
Another strand of literature analyzes the impact of price instruments in the
EU ETS by applying the model of Hotelling (1931) to intertemporal allowance
trading. Schopp et al. (2015) introduce quantity-based and price-based instru-
ments in the pre-reform EU ETS and demonstrate that a complementary price
regulation improves cost efficiency if the price is set appropriately. Fell (2016)
confirms this finding in a stochastic model. Brink et al. (2016) compare different
CPF designs and find that the CPF increases the abatement effort in the short
run but decreases it in the long run because the overall amount of allowances is
unaffected in the pre-reform EU ETS. Fuss et al. (2018) discuss a price collar
but do not account for banking decisions and, consequently, do not analyze the
effects on the MSR and the cancellation mechanism.26
Due to the complexity of the reformed EU ETS, the design of effective com-
plementary policies, such as the CPF, is not straightforward. Existing literature
points to the fact that understanding the timing of complementary policies is
vital (e.g., Perino et al., 2019 and Gerlagh et al., 2019). A complementary pol-
icy can potentially reduce overall emissions via the cancellation mechanism (cf.
Perino, 2018 and Beck and Kruse-Andersen, 2020). However, if the complemen-
tary policy is ill-timed, it can have the contrary effect and cause higher overall
emissions. The phenomenon that a well-intended policy increases overall emis-
26Another strand of literature focuses on the impact of a (national) CPF in the power sector.
Newbery et al. (2019) and Pahle et al. (2018) suggest a CPF of 25 EUR/t to decrease
emissions from the power sector and to strengthen the effect of national policies (e.g., the
German coal phase-out) on the EU ETS. Egli and Lecuyer (2017) analyze the effects of a
potential CPF on the German electricity market and prices.
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sions in the EU ETS is called the new green paradox (Gerlagh et al., 2019).27
Quemin and Trotignon (2019) as well as Bocklet and Hintermayer (2020) find
that the impact of the MSR and the cancellation mechanism depends on the
planning horizon and the degree of rationality shown by the firms in the market.
Bruninx et al. (2020) add that an explicit consideration of investment decisions
increases the impact of the MSR and the cancellation mechanism. Most akin
to the paper at hand, Quemin and Trotignon (2018) build an iterative heuristic
for the reformed EU ETS and compare the MSR and a price collar, which ad-
justs the supply of allowances if the price is above or below predefined thresholds.
Flachsland et al. (2020) point out that a CPF can improve the price stability and
the performance of the reformed EU ETS in the cases where market distortions
such as myopic firms and the waterbed effect persist.
As discussed by Flachsland et al. (2020) as well as Wood and Jotzo (2011), the
CPF can be designed in different ways: buyback, top-up tax, or auction reserve
price. These designs of the CPF are economically equivalent in a static setting,
i.e., when firms face payments for their emissions, they decide on their emissions
regardless of how they pay for them. In a dynamic context - such as the EU ETS
- the design of the CPF is crucial because firms develop expectations of future
prices.
If the CPF is implemented by buyback, a governmental institution guarantees
the buyback of an unlimited number of allowances at the specified CPF level.
The buyback design creates additional costs for the government to buy allowances
and hold them in times when prices do not increase. Hence, the government must
credibly commit to bear these costs.
If the CPF is introduced through a top-up tax, an additional tax on emissions
is imposed to bridge the difference between the market price of allowances and
the specified CPF level. As the top-up tax is positive, it constitutes a source of
governmental revenue.
If the CPF is realized as an auction reserve price, allowances will only be
auctioned if the bids are above the specified CPF level. The effect of this design
hinges on the specified primary allocation of allowances. Under the current
regulation in the EU ETS, 43% of the issued allowances are not auctioned but
allocated freely (so-called grandfathering). In this way, the allowance market is
only partly affected by an auction reserve price. Consequently, the CPF will not
raise the market price to the CPF level, if the share of auctioned allowances is
too low. Another difference is the treatment of non-auctioned allowances: non-
auctioned allowances could either be rolled over to the next auction (implicitly
banking them), placed in the MSR or cancelled immediately.28 In a setting where
27The original green paradox describes a situation in which the present emissions increase due
to an expected carbon tax in the future (Sinn, 2008).
28In Pahle et al. (2018), the auction reserve price is implemented for the power sector, and it
is implicitly assumed that the non-auctioned allowances are cancelled. In this case, there is
no need to explicitly account for the MSR and the cancellation mechanism.
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all allowances are auctioned and the non-auctioned allowances are rolled over to
the next period, the auction reserve price is equivalent to the buyback design.
3.3. A Hotelling Model of the EU ETS and the
Implementation of the CPF
In the following, Section 3.3.1 gives an overview of the model and the regulatory
rules on the allowance supply. Section 3.3.2 describes the implementation of the
different CPF designs. The parametrization of the model is specified in Section
3.3.3.
3.3.1. General Model of the EU ETS
The general model follows the theoretical work of Rubin (1996), who applies
the work of Hotelling (1931) to intertemporal emissions trading.29 This article
builds on the model from Bocklet et al. (2019), which includes the regulatory
setting of the reformed EU ETS with the MSR and the cancellation mechanism.
In comparison to the approach in Perino and Willner (2016), they add the can-
cellation mechanism and discretize the time steps to closely follow the regulatory
rules on the allowance supply. In contrast to Quemin and Trotignon (2018), who
apply an iterative heuristic to solve for rationally bounded firms, the model in
this paper finds a solution for a market equilibrium of perfectly rational firms
as a direct result of a mixed-integer optimization problem. In the following, the
essential features of the general model are introduced.
In line with existing literature (e.g., Perino and Willner, 2016, Beck and Kruse-
Andersen, 2020, and Bocklet et al., 2019), this paper assumes N homogeneous,
perfectly rational firms with perfect foresight in a perfectly competitive allowance













The firm’s objective is to minimize the discounted value of the abatement
costs C(e(t)) and the costs for allowance trading p(t)x(t) for all time periods
29Chevallier (2012) gives a comprehensive review of models in the aftermath of Rubin (1996).
30The index i is omitted for better readability, when only one firm is considered.
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t = 0, 1, . . . , T . In line with literature (e.g., Rubin, 1996), the abatement cost
function is assumed to be quadratic, i.e., C(e(t)) := 12c(t)(u(t) − e(t))
2, with
exogenous baseline emissions u(t), cost parameter c(t) and the decision variable
for realized emissions e(t).31 The allowance price p(t) is exogenous for the firm
because the firm’s decision does not influence the price within a perfectly com-
petitive allowance market. Apart from the decision on the emissions, the firm
decides on the amount of traded allowances x(t) and the number of banked al-
lowances b(t). The banking constraint assures that the bank in period t contains
the allowances from the bank in the previous period t − 1 together with the
allowances which are purchased (x(t)) or received for free (f(t)) minus the real-
ized emissions e(t). Hereby, f(t) is exogenous. Regulations prohibit firms from
borrowing allowances which will be issued in the future. Hence, the banking
variable should not be negative.32
Optimality conditions for the representative firm are derived from the Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of the optimization problem (3.1), which are
given in Appendix B.1. Based on these conditions the firm optimally chooses
emissions e(t) so that marginal abatement costs C ′(e(t)) equal the allowance
price, i.e.,
c(t)(u(t)− e(t)) = p(t). (3.2)
By using the assumption of homogeneous firms, the market equilibrium is
determined by an amended Hotelling rule from the KKT conditions
p(t+ 1)− p(t)
p(t)
= r − (1 + r)t+1µb(t)
p(t)
, (3.3)
where µb(t) is the respective dual variable for the non-borrowing constraint.
Since the KKT conditions imply a complementarity constraint, µb(t) is zero for
a positive bank b(t). The aggregate private bank held by all firms is called Total
Number of Allowances in Circulation (TNAC). Thus, the condition implies that
the allowance price rises with the interest rate r while the TNAC is non-empty.
When the TNAC is empty, the shadow costs of the non-borrowing constraint
reduce the price increase.
For the market equilibrium, the allowance purchases of the firms N · x(t)
equals the endogenous amount of auctioned allowances Sauct(t), specified by the
regulatory rules as
Sauct(t) = σ · S0(t)− Intake(t) +Reinjection(t),
31The assumption of a quadratic abatement cost function makes the problem numerically
tractable. Bruninx et al. (2020) explicitly model investment decisions in the power sec-
tor, making their cost function endogenous. However, they can solve the model only with
an iterative algorithm.
32Since the free allocation of one year occurs before the previous year’s compliance date, bor-
rowing is implicitly allowed in reality for a small part of emissions. Quemin (2020) formalizes
this aspect.
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where σ is the share of auctioned allowances of the exogenous target path
S0(t), which is corrected by the allowances inserted into the MSR (Intake(t)) or
reinjected to the market (Reinjection(t)). The target path S0(t) is set to decline
at the linear rate a(t) from the starting value S̃, i.e., S0(t) = S0(t− 1)− a(t)S̃.
Further, the freely received allowances N ·f(t) equals the amount of freely issued
allowances Sfree(t) = (1 − σ) · S0(t). Thus, the total allowance supply S(t) is
given as S(t) = Sauct(t) + Sfree(t).
The MSR regulation controls the allowance supply depending on the volume
of the TNAC. If the TNAC is above the threshold `up, allowances equivalent to
the share γ(t) of the TNAC are withheld from auction and set aside in the MSR.
If the TNAC falls below the threshold `low, allowances from the MSR are fed
back to the market in yearly tranches of R until the MSR is empty. Furthermore,
the cancellation mechanism enforces a permanent invalidation of allowances in
the MSR if the MSR volume exceeds the previous year’s auction volume.33
3.3.2. Modelling of Different CPF Designs
Throughout this paper, the implementation of the CPF is assumed across all
countries in the EU ETS.34 As discussed in Section 3.2, conclusions about the
implementation through an auction reserve price can be drawn if the auction
share in the EU ETS is increased.
For the buyback design, it is assumed that a credible governmental institution
guarantees to buy back an unlimited amount of allowances at the price of the
CPF level p(t) from the implementation year35 onwards. Hence, p(t) ≥ p(t)
is required. If p(t) = p(t), the price path may deviate from the Hotelling rule
because the governmental institution buys back allowances regardless of the ex-
pected return.36 In the case of unallocated allowances in the primary auction,
these allowances are transferred directly to the governmental institution. When
the price rises again with the interest rate, the governmental institution can sell
the allowances back to the firms. As long as the governmental institution holds
a positive number of allowances, these are included in the TNAC volume. Con-
33A formal definition of the regulatory supply rules, which are also necessary conditions for the
market equilibrium, can be found in Appendix B.2. The constraints are rearranged with
big-M constraints and integer variables to resolve non-linearities. The problem is solved as
a mixed-integer linear program.
34A national CPF only reduces emissions within the EU ETS if a mechanism exists (e.g.,
withdrawal of allowances by nation-states) that ensures that the countries without a CPF
cannot use the surplus of allowances. The political discussion on the introduction of a
CPF suggests that, at first, individual countries will introduce a national CPF, and other
countries will follow.
35Implementation year means the year in which the policy becomes effective as opposed to the
year in which it is announced.
36In this setting, all allowances are auctioned since firms will buy allowances from the primary
auction for any price marginally below the CPF and sell them back to the governmental
institution. In equilibrium, they buy and sell at the same price.
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sequently, they are also taken into account within the regulations on the MSR
and cancellation mechanism.
For the implementation of the CPF through a top-up tax, the tax τ(t) is
defined as the difference between the market price and the CPF level p(t) if the
market price is below p(t), i.e.,
τ(t) =
{
p(t)− p(t) , if p(t) < p(t)
0 , else.
The tax payment of the firms equals top-up tax times emissions. Hence, the
term τ(t)e(t) is included in the objective function of the firm. Deriving the KKT
conditions for the firm’s optimization problem including the top-up tax results
in a modified version of Equation (3.2), namely
c(t) · (u(t)− e(t)) = p(t) + τ(t). (3.4)
Thus, in equilibrium, firms choose their emissions so that the marginal abate-
ment costs equal to the market price plus top-up tax.
The existence and uniqueness of equilibria are not trivial in this setting. The
model is formulated through its KKT conditions with additional constraints on
the supply of allowances and the price. Thereby, the problem becomes a discrete
optimization problem without an objective function, i.e., a feasibility problem.
If a feasible solution to the problem is found, it is always an equilibrium. The
uniqueness of the equilibrium can only be guaranteed if there is exactly one
feasible solution. The regulatory rules on the MSR and the cancellation mech-
anism together with the implementation of the CPF require integer variables
and thus make the problem discontinuous.37 Gerlagh et al. (2019) show that
this potentially leads to multiple equilibria, which differ in their price path and
their overall level of emissions. The solution procedure takes this multiplicity
into account: In the case of multiple equilibria, the one with the highest overall
emission level is selected. This procedure implicitly assumes that firms in the EU
ETS benefit from emitting more and coordinate themselves to maximize overall
emissions and profits.
3.3.3. Parametrization of the Model
The model starts in the year 2020, with the respective parametrization as de-
scribed below. T is chosen to cover the entire period of positive emissions within
the EU ETS. With the current linear reduction factor, this will be in 2057. The
rules of the endogenous allowance supply follow the current regulation (cf. Eu-
ropean Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2003 together with
37For example, if the TNAC falls slightly below the threshold of 400 million allowances, the
auction volume in the next year increases discretely, i.e., it “jumps” upwards.
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European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2015 and Eu-
ropean Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2018). S̃ = 2199
million represents the issued allowances in 2010, and the linear reduction factor
a(t) increases from 1.74% to 2.2% in 2020. The share of auctioned allowances
σ is set to 57%. The parameters of the MSR regulation are `up = 833 million,
`low = 400 million, R = 100 million, and γ(t) = 24% until 2024 and 12% after-
wards. The initial volume of the MSR in 2019 consists of 900 million allowances,
which have been back-loaded between 2014 and 2016. Additionally, around 600
million unallocated allowances are transferred into the MSR in 2020 (European
Commission, 2015). The initial volume of the TNAC in 2019 consists of 1385
million allowances, as published by the European Commission (2020).
In addition to the regulatory rules, the market equilibrium is driven by as-
sumptions on the interest rate r, baseline emissions u(t), and the cost parameter
c(t). The interest rate is set to 8%, which estimates the weighted average cost
of capital of fossil power plants and energy-intensive industries (compare Kost
et al., 2018 and KPMG, 2017). The baseline emissions remain constant over
time at 2000 million tonnes, which is in line with the literature (e.g., Perino
and Willner, 2017). Due to the quadratic abatement cost function C(e(t)), the
last ton of carbon is abated at marginal abatement costs of c(t) · u(t), which
can be interpreted as backstop costs. Hence, the cost parameter is defined by
c(t) := backstopcosts · u(t)−1, with constant backstop costs of 150 EUR/t.38
Since the choice of these three parameters affects the model results, a robustness
analysis ensures that the main findings of this paper are preserved.39
3.4. The Impact of a European Carbon Price Floor
on Market Outcomes
The introduction of a European CPF in the EU ETS is widely discussed, as
stated in Section 3.1. This section analyzes and discusses the effects of the CPF
in the reformed EU ETS. Section 3.4.1 describes the market equilibrium in a base
scenario without the CPF and explains the interactions with the MSR and the
cancellation mechanism. Section 3.4.2 analyzes how these results change under
the different CPF designs. The CPF alters the governmental revenue of the
regulator, which is an essential aspect for policymakers. Section 3.4.3 exhibits
how governmental revenue differs between the two CPF designs. Section 3.4.4
explains how the CPF level and its implementation year affect overall emissions
through the interactions of the CPF with the cancellation mechanism.
38The backstop costs rely on cost estimates for Carbon Capture and Storage (e.g., Saygin et al.,
2012).
39Sections 3.4.1, 3.4.2 and 3.4.4 explicitly state how the parameter choices influence the model
results. Moreover, a robustness analysis is included in Appendix B.3.
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3.4.1. Base Scenario: The EU ETS Without the CPF
For the base scenario without the CPF, the market equilibrium is depicted in
Figure 3.1. The initial allowance price of 19 EUR/t in 2020 rises with the
interest rate until 2039. Thereafter, the TNAC is empty, and hence the shadow
costs of the non-borrowing constraint are positive and reduce the price increase
as implied by Equation (3.3). The price equals the backstop costs from 2057
onwards when there is no supply of allowances left. Together with the rising
prices, emissions decrease proportionally in line with the firms’ decision rule for
emissions (Equation 3.2). When the price hits the backstop level in 2057, there
are no emissions.
Figure 3.1.: Carbon price, emissions, TNAC, MSR and aggregate cancellation in the
base scenario
Until 2021, the TNAC lies above the intake threshold, and allowances are
transferred to the MSR. The volume of the MSR peaks in 2022, followed by a
one-time cancellation of 2 billion allowances in 2023. The remaining allowances
in the MSR are reinjected to the market starting in 2029 when the TNAC falls
below 400 million allowances. Bocklet et al. (2019) comprises a more detailed
description of the base scenario.
The market equilibrium changes depending on the choice of backstop costs,
interest rate, and baseline emissions. As formally shown in Bocklet et al. (2019),
a change in backstop costs only scales the absolute price level but does not affect
the level of emissions, TNAC, and cancellation. A lower interest rate leads to a
higher initial allowance price level, resulting in lower emissions, a higher TNAC,
and more cancellation. Lower baseline emissions decrease the overall allowance
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demand and the overall price level. As a consequence, emissions are lower, the
TNAC volume is higher, and more cancellation occurs.
3.4.2. Comparison of Price Effects for Different CPF Designs
In the following, the impact of different CPF designs on the development of
prices, emissions, and banking behavior is analyzed in comparison to the base
scenario (Figure 3.2). A CPF level of 40 EUR/t is assumed to be implemented
in 2025 and announced in 2020.40 Moreover, it is assumed that firms perfectly
foresee the impact of the CPF, i.e., they anticipate in 2020 that the CPF is
implemented in 2025. As discussed in prevalent literature, the anticipation of
the price regulation plays an important role for the model outcome (see Section
3.2 for a discussion of Friesen et al., 2020 and Salant et al., 2020). The TNAC
will be empty by 2040 in all cases, and thus, the results of both CPF designs
coincide with the base scenario after 2040.
The buyback design regulates the value of allowances from the implementation
year onwards. Firms anticipate the rise of the allowance price to the CPF level
in the implementation year. When the CPF is announced, firms buy allowances
to make arbitrage profits leading the price to rise to the discounted CPF level
immediately after the announcement. During the time of a binding CPF, prices
do not increase with the interest rate, and private firms have no incentive to
bank allowances. Hence, the entire TNAC between 2025 and 2030 can be fully
accounted for as quantities bought and held by the government (blue dotted line).
Since prices are higher than in the base scenario, emissions are lower in the short
run (Equation 3.2). Compared to the base scenario, private banking increases
in the short run, leading to a higher MSR volume, lower auction volumes, and
higher cancellation volumes until 2030.
Compared to the base scenario, the TNAC falls below the threshold of 400
million allowances later, and the MSR is fed back to the auctions later, leading
to a slightly higher supply of allowances after 2030. Compared to the base
scenario, the higher supply suppresses the carbon prices by 4.8% after 2030,
leading to 380 Mt more emissions between 2030 and 2040. This effect is known
as the temporal waterbed effect, i.e., the emission savings between 2020 and
2030 are partly caught up after 2030. The cancellation mechanism diminishes
40With auction reserve prices in place, the CPF level increases at a predefined rate, e.g., within
the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, the trigger prices increase by 7% annually (RGGI,
2017). Contrarily, this paper assumes a constant CPF level to simplify the effects. With a
constant CPF level, the additional abatement due to the CPF diminishes over time because
the allowance price in the base scenario rises over time. However, if the CPF level rises at a
specific rate, the regulator bears the risk of choosing the “correct” rate. A low initial price
increasing at a higher rate will result in additional abatement, which grows over time. A
high initial price increasing at a lower rate will result in a strong abatement incentive at
the beginning, diminishing over time. The level of 40 EUR/t is in line with Newbery et al.
(2019) who recommend introducing a CPF of 25-30 EUR/t in 2017, which rises with an
annual rate of 3-5%.
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Figure 3.2.: Allowance price, emissions, TNAC, MSR and cancellation for the base sce-
nario, buyback or top-up tax for a CPF level of 40 EUR/t in 2025
the temporal waterbed effect, and thus it is relatively small compared to the
pre-reform EU ETS without cancellation.
In contrast to the buyback design, where the CPF regulates the allowance
price, the top-up tax is imposed on emissions from the implementation year
onwards. Consequently, the top-up tax is not transferred automatically to earlier
periods. While the price of allowances increases with the interest rate, the total
payment for emissions (allowance price plus the top-up tax; green dotted line)
rises to the predefined level of 40 EUR/t between 2025 and 2030. If the CPF
is implemented through the top-up tax design, firms foresee that payments for
emissions become larger due to the tax from the implementation year onwards.
Hence, the top-up tax lowers emissions in comparison to the base scenario only
from its implementation year onwards to equalize marginal abatement costs and
total payments for emissions (compare Equation 3.4). The announcement of the
top-up tax reduces the value of allowances in the future. As firms anticipate
this circumstance, they use more allowances before the top-up tax comes into
effect, resulting in higher short-run emissions. Therefore, the TNAC is lower in
the short run leading to a minor reduction of the MSR, which causes a decrease
of cancellation volumes by 15 million allowances in 2023 (new green paradox
effect). After the top-up tax is implemented, firms start to emit less and bank
more so that the TNAC increases again.41 Because of the higher TNAC volume
41The increasing TNAC might cause a second intake phase for the MSR. Depending on the
implementation year of the top-up tax, this behavior can lead to further cancellation even
after 2030.
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after the CPF implementation, more allowances are available for later use. As
with the buyback design, this causes a small temporal waterbed effect, i.e., prices
are 5.1% lower after 2030, compared to the base scenario, and emissions are 410
Mt higher between 2030 and 2040. Again, this temporal waterbed effect is more
significant in the pre-reform EU ETS without cancellation.
Like the base scenario, the equilibrium paths change with different backstop
costs, interest rates, or baseline emissions. With lower (higher) backstop costs,
the overall price level decreases (increases) so that the same absolute CPF level
has a larger (smaller) effect, in particular on the aggregated cancellation vol-
ume. The effect of the same absolute CPF level also diminishes (grows) with a
lower (higher) interest rate or higher (lower) baseline emissions. In this regard,
Appendix B.3 provides more details.
To summarize, in the buyback design, the price-increasing effect of the CPF
outweighs the temporal waterbed effect leading to higher aggregated cancellation
than in the base scenario. With the top-up tax, the new green paradox effect
reduces cancellation volumes compared to the buyback design and levels them
with the base scenario. However, the overall effect on aggregate cancellation
depends on the CPF level and the implementation year, discussed in Section
3.4.4.
3.4.3. The Impact of a European CPF on Governmental
Revenue
The European CPF affects the governmental revenue within the EU ETS. When
deciding on the introduction of the CPF, policymakers need to be aware of its
impact on governmental revenue, analyzed in this section.42
In the EU ETS without the CPF, the only source for governmental revenue
is the auction revenue, which equals the product of the allowance price and the
auction volume. The CPF changes the auction revenue because it impacts the
price of allowances and the auction volume via the MSR rules (compare Figure
3.2). In the case of the top-up tax, tax revenue (top-up tax times emissions)
is another source of governmental revenue. In the case of the buyback design,
the government guarantees to buy allowances to reach the CPF level when the
CPF is implemented. The governmental bank sells those allowances back to the
market at the CPF level if firms are willing to buy them. Hence, the government
is buying and selling the allowances at the CPF level and, therefore, bears the
cost of holding the allowances (blue dotted line in Figure 3.2) when the price
remains constant.43 These capital costs are calculated as the product of the
42As discussed in Section 3.1, a CPF affects the distribution of revenue across member states.
This paper refrains from analyzing distributional effects between member states but con-
siders the aggregate revenue of the regulator.
43By assumption firms only hold allowances in the private bank (TNAC) if the market price rises
with the interest rate. Thus, when the market price remains constant, only the governmental
bank holds allowances.
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interest rate, the market price, and the volume of the governmental bank of
allowances. The governmental revenue is calculated as
governmentalrevenue(t) =
= p(t) · Sauct(t) + τ(t)·e(t)− r · p(t) · governmentalbank(t), (3.5)
where τ(t) and governmentalbank(t) are only positive if the CPF is imple-
mented as a top-up tax and buyback, respectively.
Figure 3.3 displays the time structure of the undiscounted governmental rev-
enue, which comprises auction revenue, tax revenue, and capital costs. For better
comprehension, the tax revenue and capital costs are also plotted separately.
Figure 3.3.: Undiscounted governmental revenue in the base scenario and CPF design
via buyback or top-up tax, tax revenue and capital costs
In the base scenario, the governmental revenue rises until 2039, when the
TNAC is depleted, because allowance prices increase exponentially and auction
volumes fall linearly (apart from the withheld and reinjected auction volumes
from the MSR). After 2040, the decrease in auction volume overcompensates the
increasing carbon prices so that the governmental revenue shrinks.
With the buyback design, the governmental revenue exceeds the one in the
base scenario until 2025, because the increase in market prices outweighs the
reduction in auction volumes. Between 2025 and 2030, the total governmental
revenue roughly remains on the same level, as the capital costs for the holdings
of the governmental bank diminish the increased auction revenues after 2025.
The auction revenue between the base scenario and the buyback case falls apart
after 2030, because of the different timing for the MSR reinjection.
For the top-up tax, the governmental revenues between 2020 and 2024, are
slightly below the base scenario because of the slightly lower allowance price.
Between 2025 and 2030, the top-up tax, on the one hand, generates additional
tax revenues, but on the other hand, reduces the auction revenue (as lower
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emissions reduce the auction volumes through the MSR rules). After 2030 the
governmental revenue coincides with the buyback design.
Summing up, the CPF increases overall governmental revenue independent of
its design.44 The buyback program reduces emissions immediately in 2020, and,
at the same time, generates additional auction revenue, which can be partly used
to compensate firms for higher abatement costs. The top-up tax also raises the
governmental revenue but only after its implementation year in 2025.
3.4.4. The Impact of the CPF Level and Implementation Year
on Aggregate Cancellation
The CPF reduces overall emissions within the EU ETS if it increases aggregate
cancellation, as described in Section 3.4.2. The general performance of the CPF
is not affected by its level and implementation year. Nevertheless, the choice of
these regulatory parameters has a significant impact on the quantitative results.
This section evaluates the impact of the CPF level and implementation year on
aggregate cancellation. All scenarios below assume that the policy is anticipated
in 2020. Note that in Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 the CPF level and the implemen-
tation year vary on the x-axis, i.e., each dot represents the aggregate cancellation
for an entire scenario.
Figure 3.4 shows aggregate cancellation volumes for different CPF levels im-
plemented in 2025. The CPF is effective only above 28 EUR/t in 2025 because
the carbon price rises to that level already in the base scenario.45 In the buy-
back design, the aggregate cancellation increases steadily with the CPF level. As
described in Section 3.4.2, the CPF immediately raises the market price to the
discounted CPF level. Reduced emissions increase the TNAC volume, result-
ing in higher MSR intake and lower auction volumes, hence increasing aggregate
cancellation. These relations persist with a higher CPF level, and the magnitude
increases.
44The total discounted governmental revenue is higher for the top-up tax if the same interest
rate applies to the government as to firms. For higher interest rates the buyback design
generates a higher discounted revenue.
45If one accounts for price risk, even a CPF below the expected price level incentivizes in-
vestment in abatement technology due to reduced price risk. Salant et al. (2020) find that
even a soft price floor below the expected price level is effective in a stochastic model with
demand shocks (“action at a distance”).
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Figure 3.4.: Aggregate cancellation for different CPF levels for an implementation in
2025
Overall, the top-up tax leads to similar results: the higher the CPF level,
the higher the aggregate cancellation. However, additional cancellation only oc-
curs for CPF levels above 40 EUR/t, and the amount is smaller compared to
the buyback design. The top-up tax entails two opposing effects: on the one
hand, the top-up tax increases costs for emissions after its implementation and
therefore reduces emissions. Analogously to the buyback design, this increases
cancellation, particularly after the implementation year. This effect grows with
a higher CPF level. On the other hand, firms anticipate the top-up tax and emit
more before the implementation year compared to the base scenario, which re-
duces the first cancellation in 2023 and, consequently, the aggregate cancellation.
Again, this effect grows with the CPF level. The numerical results show that
both effects more or less cancel each other out at CPF levels below 40 EUR/t.46
Hence, the effect of the new green paradox, described in Section 3.4.2, is rather
small. Compared to the buyback design, aggregate cancellation increases more
slowly with the top-up tax design even for CPF levels above 40 EUR/t. Since
the MSR injection factor drops from 24% to 12% after 2023, the increase in the
TNAC after 2025 leads to a lower MSR and lower cancellation volumes.
In order to compare different implementation years of the CPF, a CPF level
of 27.22 EUR/t in 2020 is assumed, increasing to 86.36 EUR/t in 2035 with the
interest rate of 8%. When the CPF is implemented later, it immediately starts
on a higher CPF level. This assumption is necessary because the effect of the
CPF diminishes when the price in the base scenario rises above the CPF level
before the implementation year. A rising CPF level ensures that the CPF is
binding even with a late implementation year. Again, firms anticipate the CPF
level and the implementation year.
46In fact, at CPF levels between 30 and 40 EUR/t, aggregate cancellation decreases slightly
by up to 15 Mt.
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With the buyback design, the CPF immediately becomes effective with its
discounted level, because firms perfectly anticipate the CPF.47 Consequently,
the implementation year does not impact aggregate cancellation (compare Figure
3.5). This finding hinges both on the anticipation of the CPF and the rising CPF
level.
Figure 3.5.: Aggregate cancellation for different implementation years of a rising CPF
level (27.22 EUR/t in 2020 to 86.37 EUR/t in 2035)
With the top-up tax design, aggregate cancellation is decreasing with a later
implementation year. Since the top-up tax is not automatically transferred to
other periods, unlike the buyback design, a later implementation year leads to
fewer years with a CPF policy in place. However, the exact effects of the CPF
on cancellation are more ambiguous due to counterbalancing effects over time
and the asymmetric regulation of the MSR and cancellation mechanism. When
implemented in 2020, top-up tax and buyback are equivalent. However, if the
top-up tax comes into effect later, firms emit more before the implementation
year because they thereby can reduce their abatement costs. The difference
in emissions compared to the base scenario becomes larger with an earlier im-
plementation because firms have fewer years to counteract the top-up tax with
higher emissions. Thus, the first cancellation volume in 2023 exceeds the one
in the base scenario for implementation before 2021. For later implementation
years, firms manage to increase short-run emissions to reduce the cancellation
volume in 2023 to around 1500 Mt. With a later implementation year, addi-
tional cancellation might occur later. In response to the top-up tax, firms cut
emissions, and the TNAC rises above the threshold of 833 million after the im-
plementation year. The increased TNAC causes a higher MSR volume, lower
auction volumes, and higher cancellation volumes in later years. The later the
tax is implemented, the less cancellation is caused by this secondary effect as the
TNAC already lies at a lower level. Overall, the aggregate cancellation declines
with the implementation year.
47If banking of allowances is permitted, firms do not differentiate between a discounted CPF
today and a CPF tomorrow.
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In general, a higher CPF level and an earlier implementation year magnify the
impact of the CPF and lead to higher aggregate cancellation. A higher CPF level
has a more pronounced effect for the buyback design as it immediately raises
allowance prices to the discounted CPF level. When the CPF level increases
with the interest rate, the market outcomes, and, in particular, the aggregate
cancellation are independent of the implementation year in the buyback design.
This result follows by construction and the assumption of perfectly anticipating
firms. For the top-up tax, aggregate cancellation is higher the earlier the tax is
implemented.
The market equilibrium depends on the assumed baseline emissions and inter-
est rate. However, the general effects described above are robust towards other
parameter choices. Appendix B.3 gives an overview of aggregate cancellation
with respect to baseline emissions and interest rates. Lower (higher) baseline
emissions imply a lower (higher) price level in the base scenario. Thus, the effect
of the CPF is enlarged (diminished) for both CPF designs. A lower interest rate
implies a higher initial price level and higher cancellation in the base scenario,
which diminishes the effect of the CPF on aggregate cancellation.
To conclude, the introduction of a sufficiently high European CPF decreases
overall emissions. Depending on the design of the CPF, however, emissions de-
crease or increase in the short run since private firms face different emissions
and banking rationales. The buyback design enables to automatically trans-
fer the CPF level to earlier periods so that emissions are reduced immediately.
Contrarily, the top-up tax incentivizes firms to increase emissions before the
implementation year.
3.5. Conclusion and Policy Implications
The introduction of a CPF in the EU ETS has been suggested in scientific and
political discussions both before and after the recent reforms. A European CPF
is proposed to set reliable incentives for low-carbon investments and to increase
abatement efforts. This article uses a discrete-time model of the reformed EU
ETS to analyze the impact of the CPF on market outcomes such as allowance
prices, banking, and emissions. Due to the cancellation mechanism in the re-
formed EU ETS, the CPF can, in principle, reduce overall emissions. Therefore,
if the CPF increases aggregate cancellation, it becomes an effective instrument
for emission reduction. Consequently, this work particularly considers aggregate
cancellation. Furthermore, the effect of the CPF on governmental revenue is
examined because the fiscal budget plays a significant role for policymakers.
The impact of the CPF depends on its design: this paper compares the design
of a governmental buyback program of allowances with the design of a top-up tax
on emissions. The buyback design sets a boundary on the value of allowances
from the implementation year onwards. Immediately after the announcement
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of the buyback program, firms anticipate that the price of allowances rises to
the CPF level. They start to buy allowances to make arbitrage profits, directly
causing the price to rise to the discounted CPF level. Thus, as soon as the CPF
is announced, firms choose a lower emission level based on the discounted CPF
level. Lower emissions lead to higher banking volumes, and, as a result, to more
intake into the MSR and more cancellation of allowances.
The top-up tax imposes a tax on emissions, which tops the market price of
allowances up to the CPF level from the implementation year onwards. Hence,
the top-up tax decreases the value of allowances in earlier periods, causing firms
to raise their emissions in anticipation of the upcoming tax. Only after the
implementation year, firms start to lower their emissions. Consequently, the
effect on aggregate cancellation is ambiguous. If the CPF level is low or the CPF
is implemented late, aggregate cancellation is slightly below the base scenario.
Thus, if the design or timing of the CPF is ill-chosen, such a policy intervention
can be counter-effective (new green paradox). Despite being equivalent in a static
setting, the design choice for the CPF matters in a dynamic context, such as the
EU ETS.
For both designs, the introduction of the CPF increases governmental revenue.
In the buyback design, the increased auction revenues before implementation
outweigh the capital costs for holding allowances at the constant CPF level. On
the contrary, the tax revenue of the top-up tax is generated only after imple-
mentation, and the auction revenues before the implementation even decrease
compared to the base scenario. For both designs, the impact of the CPF grows
with its level and falls with a later implementation year. In the buyback design,
the effect of the CPF on prices, emissions, and aggregate cancellation directly
increases with its level. If one assumes a CPF level, which rises with the interest
rate, the implementation year of the CPF does not affect the buyback CPF.
For the top-up tax, the impact is ambiguous: On the one hand, the tax lowers
emissions by increasing their prices. On the other hand, it incentivizes short-run
emissions because firms anticipate the tax. Hence, a higher CPF increases the
aggregate cancellation volume less than in the buyback design. Moreover, aggre-
gate cancellation decreases with a later implementation year, as the anticipation
effect grows over time.
For policymakers willing to introduce a CPF to decrease overall emissions,
the buyback design is preferable to the top-up tax in the following aspects:
Firstly, the buyback design reduces emissions immediately after the policy’s
announcement. Secondly, the buyback design reduces overall emissions more
vigorously than the top-up tax. Thirdly, the buyback design does not cause
counter-productive announcement effects. If the top-up tax is selected for other
reasons, the policymaker should make sure to keep the announcement effect as
small as possible, i.e., announce the top-up tax shortly before its implementation.
This article analyzes different CPF designs in a stylized setting of the EU ETS,
e.g., by assuming perfect markets and perfect foresight. Regulatory uncertainty
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plays an essential role in the EU ETS, itself, and for the CPF. Further research
may evaluate how the expectations on policy adjustments drive the decision
making of the firms. Moreover, it could be examined how regulators can credibly
announce the CPF and commit to it. Another topic for future research should
be the impact of a national CPF in the reformed EU ETS, as a national CPF
seems politically easier to realize.
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4. How Does the EU ETS Reform Impact
Allowance prices? The Role of Myopia,
Hedging Requirements and the Hotelling
Rule
4.1. Introduction
Since 2005, the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) builds the
foundation of European environmental policy. Aggregate emissions within the
EU ETS are limited by the number of allowances supplied to the market. The
cap is determined on a yearly basis and set to decline annually. Firms in the EU
ETS can optimize themselves intertemporally by banking allowances for future
use.
Due to low allowance prices in the market and hence a weak investment sig-
nal for low-carbon technology, policy makers reformed the EU ETS substantially
between 2014 and 2018, including the backloading of allowances, the Market Sta-
bility Reserve (MSR) and a cancellation mechanism. As the aggregate private
bank held by firms in the market determines the size of the MSR and the can-
cellation volumes, the allowance supply is partially endogenous in the reformed
EU ETS.
In the aftermath of the reforms, prices in the EU ETS rose from 5 EUR/t in
2017 to over 24 EUR/t in 2019, while the aggregate private bank remained almost
constant at around 1650 million allowances. Practitioners from the energy sector
state that the reform fundamentals, namely the introduction of the MSR and the
announcement of the cancellation mechanism, caused prices to spike (Wölfling
and Germeshausen, 2019).
Theoretical models accurately depicting the new EU ETS regulation yet fail to
attribute the large price increase in 2018 to the underlying reform fundamentals.
Perino and Willner (2016) find that the MSR shifts allowances from the present
to the future but is allowance preserving, i.e. the overall emission cap is not
altered. They conclude that the MSR only affects prices if allowances become
temporarily scarce. In this case, prices slightly increase in the short run but drop
below their baseline level in the long run.
Bocklet et al. (2019) and Beck and Kruse-Andersen (2020) amend the work
of Perino and Willner (2016) by including the cancellation mechanism into their
models. Both papers find that the cancellation of allowances stored in the MSR
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increases the overall price level at all times but that the price increase is rather
negligible in the short run.48
All three papers build on the seminal works of Rubin (1996) and Chevallier
(2012) who established a model for intertemporal allowance trading. The right
to emit is treated as a scarce, non-renewable resource. Prices of such a resource
develop according to the Hotelling rule (Hotelling, 1931), given complete and
perfectly competitive markets and rational firms that have perfect information
and fully anticipate market and regulatory developments until the end of time.
The Hotelling rule states that prices are determined by the discounted value of
the expected backstop costs. The shortening of allowances caused by the reform
shifts the price path upwards. Due to discounting, short-run prices only increase
little while the main price effect of the reform plays out in the long run. Thus,
those theoretical models fail to explain the price increase through the reform
fundamentals.
Krautkraemer (1998) challenges the assumptions of Hotelling models stating
that governments intervene, firms have market power, are risk averse or short-
sighted. Thus, theoretical Hotelling price paths are rarely visible in reality.
Instead, the market depletion path can tilt towards the present or the future,
prices may be volatile around a trend or even fully deviate from the Hotelling
price path (Krautkraemer, 1998).
While there is no indication that the EU ETS lacks competition, literature
and industry experts likewise stress the importance of myopia (e.g., Flachsland
et al., 2020) and hedging (e.g. Gallier et al., 2015, Cludius and Betz, 2016 and
Kollenberg and Taschini, 2019) - as a result of risk aversion - on market outcomes.
The role of either myopia or hedging requirements within the EU ETS has
been previously researched by Willner (2018), Schopp and Neuhoff (2013), Ti-
etjen et al. (2019) and Quemin and Trotignon (2019). Willner (2018) analyzes
the impact of limited foresight in a two-period partial equilibrium model of the
EU ETS. He finds that limited foresight leads to an underestimation of long-
term scarcity. Consequently, prices are lower in period one and higher in period
two than in the perfect foresight scenario and overall abatement costs increase.
Given limited foresight, the introduction of the MSR leads to higher short-run
prices and lower long-run prices than in the case with perfect foresight. A similar
two-period partial equilibrium model is also set up in Schopp and Neuhoff (2013)
where the allowance demand for hedging requirements is modelled in response
to changes in expectation of fuel and power prices. They argue that if firms flex-
ibly adjust their hedging needs, they can stabilize prices. Tietjen et al. (2019)
understand hedging as a firm’s response to uncertainty. Using a stochastic op-
timization model, they find that hedging leads to a U-shaped price curve in the
EU ETS. They further evaluate how the introduction of the MSR changes the
hedging decision of a firm. Quemin and Trotignon (2019) use a rolling-horizon
48Bocklet et al. (2019) further show that the main price effect stems from the increase of the
linear reduction factor rather than the MSR and the cancellation mechanism.
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model where firms are short-sighted and exhibit cognitive limitations in respond-
ing to governmental interventions. The model is calibrated to historic outcomes,
choosing a planning horizon and interest rate that minimizes the difference be-
tween simulated results and historical data ex-post. They find that applying a
low interest rate of only 3% and a planning horizon of 13 years historic data can
be mimicked best.
This paper differs from the aforementioned approaches and assumptions in
several aspects:
Myopia is incorporated through a rolling-horizon approach into a closed-form
dynamic optimization model set up in Bocklet et al. (2019). Within the model,
we depict the market and the recent reforms on a yearly resolution instead of
deducing market results from a simplified two period model.
We evaluate the impact of the EU ETS reform on market outcomes by mod-
elling an exogenous hedging share. Since firms hedge their future power sales,
they may have limited potential to shift their portfolio to low-carbon production
in the short run. It is therefore likely that their exogenous hedging requirement
is substantially larger than an endogenously derived optimal bank.
As a further extension to previous work, we use stylized facts to determine
the underlying fundamentals driving the market outcomes in the third trading
period of the EU ETS. In particular, we compare pre- and post-reform model
results with the observed market data. By analyzing model outcomes under
myopia, hedging requirements and a combination of both, we shed light on the
underlying fundamentals of the price increase caused by the reform.
The paper at hands adds three main contributions to the literature:
1. Implementing myopia into a discrete-time partial equilibrium model of the
EU ETS where cancellation volumes are determined in a closed-form solu-
tion, we find that myopic firms emit more in the short run than under the
cost-minimal abatement path. This market friction can be partly mitigated
through the introduction of the MSR. At the same time, myopia leads to
lower banking volumes and hence lower cancellation volumes. Thus, drop-
ping the assumption of perfect foresight alters market outcomes in the
dynamic setting of the reformed EU ETS.
2. By including firms with exogenous hedging requirements into the dynamic
optimization model of the EU ETS, we show that hedging requirements
drive cancellation volumes. Thus, prevalent theoretical models neglecting
hedging requirements may underestimate the overall effect of the reform.
Further, the restrictive allowance supply in the EU ETS along with the
hedging requirements of firms may cause physical shortages in today’s al-
lowance market.
3. By comparing the model results with stylized facts of the EU ETS, we shed
light on the underlying fundamentals driving market outcomes in the third
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trading period. Neither myopia nor hedging requirements on their own are
able to fully depict the market outcomes. Only the combination of myopic
behavior, hedging requirements and the introduction of the reform is able
to simultaneously explain low initial price levels, a steep price increase in
the midst of the third trading period and a large private bank after the
reform.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 4.2 we set up
a partial equilibrium model of the EU ETS. Myopia and hedging requirements
are integrated into the pre- and post-reform model. In Section 4.3 we show how
myopia impacts model results in the reformed EU ETS. Analogously, in Section
4.4 we show how hedging requirements drive model results. In Section 4.5, we
discuss if the reform can explain the market outcomes in the third trading period
of the EU ETS given bounded rationality. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2. A Hotelling Model of the EU ETS
Our partial equilibrium model of the EU ETS builds on the model from Bocklet
et al. (2019) who use a discrete-time version of the model set up by Rubin
(1996). In the following we briefly outline the decision making of a representative
firm in a perfectly competitive allowance market. Since the market consist of
homogeneous firms, the market demand is derived by the aggregated choice of
firms.
The base model assumes a representative firm which is deciding on emis-
sions e(t), banking b(t) and net allowance sales x(t) for all time periods t =











s.t. b(t)− b(t− 1) = x(t)− e(t) for all t = 1, 2, . . . , T
b(t) ≥ 0
x(t), e(t) ≷ 0.
(4.1)
The objective function consists of the discounted (interest rate r) costs for
abatement and allowance trading. Following Perino and Willner (2016) and
Bocklet et al. (2019), we assume a quadratic and convex abatement cost function
with cost parameter c and baseline emissions u. The allowance price p(t) is
determined by the market and is hence exogenous in the firm’s optimization
problem. If allowance purchases exceed emissions, the constraint ensures that
the excess allowances are stored in the private bank of the firm. According to
regulation, borrowing is not allowed in the EU ETS. Thus, we require a positive
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bank. The optimality conditions for the firm are given by the Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) conditions, which are stated in Appendix C.1.
To derive the market equilibrium conditions, the following sections introduce
the pre-reform (Section 4.2.1) and post-reform (Section 4.2.2) market rules. In
Section 4.2.3 we explain how we model myopic firms with a rolling horizon ap-
proach. Section 4.2.4 exhibits how the firm’s decision problem changes in light
of hedging requirements. The parametrization of the model is summarized in
Section 4.2.5.
4.2.1. Pre-Reform Market
The pre-reform market is assumed to be the EU ETS at the beginning of the
third trading period in 2013, i.e. the reforms on backloading, the MSR and the
cancellation mechanism are not included in the model yet.49 In the following, the
variables introduced above are used for aggregate levels, i.e. e and b are overall
emissions and banking. Policy makers refer to the aggregated private bank b also
as Total Number of Allowances in Circulation (TNAC).
In the pre-reform case with unrestricted banking, the supply of allowances
is exogenously determined by the regulator.50 The market equilibrium is de-
termined by a price path such that the firm’s optimality conditions hold and
aggregated emissions over time do not exceed aggregated allowance supply, i.e.∑t
t̃=0 e(t̃) ≤
∑t
t̃=0 S(t̃) for all t = 0, 1, . . . , T .
From the market equilibrium conditions and the KKT conditions we can derive
an amended Hotelling price rule
p(t+ 1)− p(t)
p(t)
= r − (1 + r)t+1µb(t)
p(t)
. (4.2)
Hence, the market price rises with the interest rate as long as the aggregated
private bank is greater than zero.51 If the bank drops to zero, prices rise at a
lower rate.
49Since the EU ETS has been reformed in 2015 and 2018, the pre-reform case serves as a
counterfactual after the reform is introduced.
50We amend the allowance supply by the expected number of unallocated allowances equally
distributed over the years 2013-2020.
51We assign the dual multiplier µb(t) to the banking flow constraint in the firm’s optimization
problem.
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4.2.2. Post-Reform Market
In the post-reform market the reforms on backloading of allowances, the MSR
and the cancellation mechanism are included in the model.52
Backloading refers to the decision made by policy makers in 2014 to postpone
the auctioning of 900 million allowances. It is implemented in the post-reform
model as a reduction of the auction volumes in 2014, 2015 and 2016. In line with
regulation (cf. European Parliament and the Council of the European Union,
2015), the backloaded allowances are inserted into the MSR in 2019 and 2020
together with allowances that remain unallocated in the third trading period.
The MSR was established by the European Commission in 2015, became oper-
ational in 2019 and serves as a public bank of allowances that shifts the allowance
supply partly to the future while keeping the total number of allowances con-
stant (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2015). In
2018, the EU introduced a cancellation mechanism that will become operational
in 2023. If the cancellation mechanism is activated, it renders a share of al-
lowances stored in the MSR invalid (European Parliament and the Council of
the European Union, 2018).
With the introduction of the MSR and the cancellation mechanism, the al-
lowance supply is no longer exogenously determined. If the TNAC exceeds a
certain threshold `up, a share (γ(t)) of allowances is withhold from the auction
and put into the MSR. If the TNAC falls below the threshold `low, R allowances
are reinjected from the MSR into the auction. With a(t) being the exogenous
linear reduction factor, the partly endogenous allowance supply is given by
Sauct(t) = Sauct(t− 1)− a(t)S0auct − Intake(t) +Reinjection(t). (4.3)










R if TNAC(t− 1) < `low ∧MSR(t) ≥ R,
MSR(t) if TNAC(t− 1) < `low ∧MSR(t) < R,
0 else.
(4.5)
52In order to show the effect of the reform, we model the post-reform scenario from 2013
onwards. The post-reform scenario before the reforms thereby serves as a counterfactual
which postulates that the market participants are already aware of the upcoming policy
changes in 2013.
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Hence, the volume of allowances in the MSR is given as
MSR(t) = MSR(t− 1) + Intake(t)−Reinjection(t)− Cancel(t). (4.6)
If the MSR exceeds the auction volume of the previous year, allowances in the
MSR are invalidated for future use, such that
Cancel(t) =
{
MSR(t)− Sauct(t− 1) if MSR(t) ≥ Sauct(t− 1),
0 otherwise.
(4.7)
The accurate modelling of the MSR and cancellation mechanism within our
partial equilibrium model allows for a closed-form solution of MSR and cancel-
lation volumes.
4.2.3. The Model Under Myopia
In economic theory, perfect foresight postulates the assumption that the decision
maker is fully informed about the exogenous environment for every point in time.
Thereby, firms optimize themselves until the end of time, markets clear at all
states and prices follow expectations (Bray, 2018). In reality, however, firms are
either incapable or unwilling to consider the long-term future (Edenhofer et al.,
2017) or regulatory uncertainty regarding the long-term future forces firms to
neglect it. Thus, it is likely that firms are myopic, i.e. decide under a limited
planning horizon. As time goes by, firms update their decisions in a rolling
horizon model.
In this section we therefore deviate from the assumption of perfect foresight
and assume that firms are prone to myopia. For a planning horizon of H years the











s.t. b(t)− b(t− 1) = x(t)− e(t) for all t = τ, τ + 1, . . . , τ +H
b(t) ≥ 0
x(t), e(t) ≷ 0.
(4.8)
In the start year τ the myopic firm decides on emissions, banking and allowance
trade only for the next H years. The firm disregards any information about
the future after this planning horizon.53 Further, the firm is able to update
53In the extreme case that firms only have a planning horizon of one year, the dynamic opti-
mization problem becomes static and b(t) = 0 for all t = 1, . . . , T .
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its decisions as time passes and future unveils. We implement this updating
procedure with a rolling horizon approach:
Algorithm: Rolling horizon of the myopic firm
for τ = 0, 1, . . . , T do
Solve M(τ,H);
Fix e(τ), x(τ), b(τ);
end
Accordingly, the firm optimizes itself from the current year τ until τ + H
and implements the decision for the current year. In the next year, the firms
planning horizon is extended and the firm is able to plan for the next period,
taking into account the implemented decisions from previous periods. During
this next planning phase, all future decisions can be revised in order to process
new information. Hence, the Hotelling price rule holds in the planning process
but may not be visible ex-post.
4.2.4. The Model with Hedging Requirements
In this section, we deviate from the assumption of perfectly rational firms and
assume that firms are risk averse. Power producers, and thereby the largest
group of emitters in the EU ETS, hedge against allowance price risk based on
the quantity of power sold forward (Doege et al., 2009 and Cludius and Betz,
2016). The precise hedging strategy strongly depends on the flexibility of the
portfolio and thus differs among companies and industries (Schopp and Neuhoff,
2013). We assume that the homogeneous firms in the model have the same
hedging requirements and hedge themselves through a buy-and-bank strategy,
i.e. by holding allowances in their private bank to cover a certain share of their
planned emissions for the upcoming years.
The non-negativity constraint for banking from the cost minimization problem
M (Equation 4.1) needs to be adjusted in order to take the hedging requirements




hedgeshare(t̃− t) · e(t̃), (4.9)
where hedgeshare(t̃ − t) is an exogenous parameter defined by the firm that
expresses how many allowances need to be banked in period t for emissions in
the future period t̃. This adjustment of the constraint changes the corresponding
Lagrangian and equilibrium conditions which are stated in Appendix C.1. We
receive the amended Hotelling rule (Equation 4.2) with the dual variable µb(t)
for the hedging constraint (Equation 4.9). Accordingly, the price increases with
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the interest rate if the firms bank more than their hedging requirements. If the
hedging requirement becomes binding, prices are allowed to deviate from the
Hotelling price rule.
4.2.5. Parametrization
The above models are implemented as mixed-integer models in GAMS and solved
with CPLEX. To do so, the model is parametrized to depict the actual regulatory
setting of the EU ETS.
The regulatory parameters of the exogenous and endogenous supply rules are
taken from EU regulation. The initial supply in 2010 is 2199 million allowances
and set to decline with a linear reduction factor of 1.74% until 2020 and 2.2% af-
terwards (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2018).54
The auction share remains constant over time at 57%. The TNAC at the be-
ginning of the third trading period is set to 2109 million allowances (European
Commission, 2019). For the post-reform model, the upper and lower thresholds
of the MSR are set to `up = 833 and `low = 400, respectively. Further, γ(t), the
share of the TNAC which is inserted into the MSR is 24% until 2023 and 12%
afterwards. If the TNAC falls below the lower threshold, tranches of R = 100
million allowances are reinjected to the market (European Parliament and the
Council of the European Union, 2015). The MSR is initially endowed with 900
million backloaded allowances. We further assume that a total of 600 million un-
allocated allowances are inserted into the MSR in 2020 (European Commission,
2015).
Since EU ETS regulation beyond 2030 is not decided on yet, the results de-
picted in Section 4.3 and Section 4.4 focus on the third and fourth trading period,
showing results from 2013 until 2030. However, it is indisputable that the EU
ETS will continue beyond the fourth trading period.55 Thus the model is ran
until 2057 when the EU ETS is assumed to reach zero emissions.56
In addition to the regulatory parameter values described, further parameter
assumptions are needed: The level of baseline emissions is assumed to be ex-
ogenously given at u = 2130 million tonnes CO2 equivalent (CO2e) and held
constant over time as e.g. in Perino and Willner (2016). We follow Bocklet et al.
(2019) and determine the cost parameter c through the price of a backstop tech-
54In order to decouple the effect of the MSR and the cancellation mechanism from the effect
of the increased linear reduction factor, we also adjust the linear reduction factor in the
pre-reform scenario.
55In light of the ’European Green Deal’ recently announced by the European Commission, it
seems likely that the number of issued allowances will decline even faster. In that case, the
last allowance would be issued earlier and the backstop costs would be hit earlier.
56In the Hotelling model the point in time where the model reaches zero emissions falls together
with the point in time where marginal abatement costs equal the backstop costs.
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nology with backstop costs BC = 150 EUR/t CO2e such that c =
BC
u . Further,
all costs are discounted at a yearly interest rate of r = 8%.57
Since there is no consensus on the level of myopia and the hedging requirements
of firms, we depict various scenario results covering a wide range of parameter
assumptions. The planning horizon of firms widely differs among industries,
size and ownership structure. In Section 4.3, we show the results for planning
horizons H of 3, 5 and 10 years and compare them to the results under perfect
foresight. The wide range of planning horizons depicts the discrepancy found
in the literature: Stonehouse and Pemberton (2002) find that two thirds of the
small and medium sized manufacturing firms have a planing horizon of 1-3 years.
Edenhofer et al. (2017) suggest that power producers have planning horizons of
5-6 years. Souder et al. (2016) research publicly traded manufacturing firms and
find an average planning horizon of 12 years.
Comparably, the parametrization of the hedging share is meant to reflect a
broad range of potential hedging schedules. A study by Eurelectric (2009) evalu-
ates the hedging requirements of forward power sales from large power producers
in Europe. It suggests that at least 60% of power sales are hedged one year ahead,
30% two years ahead and 10% three years ahead.58 While power generators tend
to buy derivatives to hedge the inputs for their power sales, non-regulated en-
tities such as financial investors buy the respective physical allowances on the
spot market (Cludius and Betz, 2016). They hereby act as counterparties for the
power generators so that the allowance futures of the forward power sales are
fully hedged through a buy-and-bank strategy. We assume that firms are not
able to deviate from their exogenous hedging schedules.
t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3
0% 0% 0% 0%
40% 40% 20% 6.67%
60% 60% 30% 10%
80% 80% 40% 13.33%
Table 4.1.: Exogenous hedging schedules
We depict a wide range of possible hedging requirements by scaling the above
described hedging schedule proportionally.59 The hedging shares for the different
hedging schedules are given in Table 4.1.
57An extensive sensitivity analysis of those parameter assumptions can be found in Bocklet
et al. (2019).
58This is in accordance with the publication of one of Europe’s biggest power producer who
stated in 2019 that at least 60% of their power sales were hedged until 2022 (RWE AG,
2019).
59We only implement hedging requirements on the share of auctioned allowances and thereby
assume that free allowance allocation serves as an implicit hedge.
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4.3. Model Results Under Myopia
As stated in Section 4.1, it is often assumed that firms have a limited planning
horizon. Therefore, the aim of this section is to understand how myopia changes
the model results of the EU ETS in the pre- and post-reform scenario.
Myopic firms have a limited planning horizon H. Hence, they neglect all
information (e.g. allowance demand and regulatory rules) beyond this planning
horizon t + H. As time goes by, the future unfolds and firms update their
decisions based on the revelations.
Figure 4.1.: Allowance prices, emissions, TNAC and MSR for the pre- and post-reform
scenario with different planning horizons
Figure 4.1 compares the results (prices, emissions, TNAC and MSR) of the
pre- and post-reform model for different degrees of myopia (planning horizon of
3, 5 and 10 years as well as perfect foresight).
Under perfect foresight, emission levels in the short and medium run are
strictly smaller in the post-reform case. In accordance to the firm’s equilib-
rium constraint (allowance price equals marginal abatement cost), price levels
are strictly larger in the post-reform case. However, the overall price effect of the
reform is small, in particular in the short run, since the cancellation of allowances
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stored in the MSR leads to a supply reduction from the long end. This finding is
in line with the findings of Bocklet et al. (2019) and Beck and Kruse-Andersen
(2020).
Once the assumption of perfect foresight is dropped, the divergence between
pre- and post-reform model results becomes more noticeable. In the pre-reform
case, myopia leads to considerably lower short-run prices than under perfect
foresight. The shorter the planning horizon H of a firm, the lower short-run
prices. Consequently, emissions of myopic firms are high and abatement efforts
are low in the short run.60 Due to the large ”surplus” of allowances early on,
short planning horizons even lead to prices of zero. This implies no abatement
efforts since baseline emissions can be completely covered by the initial TNAC
and the respective yearly supply.
These large emission levels early on as well as the small TNAC kept by myopic
firms induce long-run scarcity. Thereby, emission levels in the long run lie below
those of firms with perfect foresight. Correspondingly, by 2030 prices under
myopia are higher than prices under perfect foresight. Since myopic firms update
their decisions as soon as future scarcity unveils, the shorter the planning horizon
of firms, the steeper the corresponding price increase.
While myopia changes the banking behavior of firms, the banking decision
determines the size of the MSR and thereby the overall allowance cap. Thus,
given that firms are myopic, the EU ETS reform considerably alters the market
outcome, as shown in the post-reform scenario.
Under myopia the initial allowance price level is below the price level in the
case of perfect foresight. As in the pre-reform scenario, this is due to the fact
that myopic firms disregard the future scarcity of allowances and hence emit
more in the short run, resulting in a smaller TNAC. Comparable to the pre-
reform scenario, the smaller the planning horizon H, the lower the prices in the
short run. However, since the allowance supply is eventually delayed through
the MSR intake, prices are expected to increase. While this supply reduction is
priced-in under perfect foresight, myopic firms do not foresee the resulting price
increase caused by this supply reduction, and thus prices increase at a rate above
the interest once firms update their decisions. This price increase in light of the
MSR intake is thus steeper than under perfect foresight. In order to account
for this short-term supply shortage, myopic firms correct their banking decision
upwards as the future unfolds.
As firms hold an overall smaller TNAC in the short run, long-run scarcity
increases for shorter planning horizons. This causes the firms to update their
decisions more strongly to match the decreasing allowance supply. Hence, firms
correct their emission levels downwards and their banking levels upwards, overall
causing prices to deviate upwards from the original Hotelling path. Due to the
60Following the common assumption that environmental pollution exhibits convex damage
curves, i.e. early emissions cause more damage than later ones (Rubin, 1996), myopia
increases environmental damage cost.
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rolling horizon model and the updating of firms’ decisions, the Hotelling price
rule does not hold ex-post, despite its relevance in the planning process of the
firm ex-ante. Since prices increase steeper than predicted by the Hotelling price
rule, the price level in 2030 is higher under myopia than under perfect foresight.
In order to evaluate the effect of the reform, we compare the results of the pre-
and the post-reform model under myopia. Two main aspects are worthwhile to
notice:
First, initial prices in the post-reform model exceed those in the pre-reform
model. Because of backloaded and unallocated allowances, the overall allowance
supply in early years is significantly smaller in the post-reform than in the pre-
reform scenario.61 This finding also holds for perfect foresight, but the effect
gets stronger under myopia.
Second, in the long run the divergence between prices under myopia and per-
fect foresight is substantially smaller in the post-reform than in the pre-reform
setting. Thus, the reform mitigates the market frictions created by myopia.62
The reason for this lies in the intertemporal shift of the allowance supply induced
by the MSR. If firms are myopic, e.g. H = 5, they do not account for the higher
price level caused by the MSR intake. Hereby, firms overestimate the availability
of allowances in future markets and underestimate market prices. The smaller
the planning horizon, the smaller the TNAC. This is also found by Quemin and
Trotignon (2019). A small TNAC leads to low MSR intake and (if any) low can-
cellation volume. Thus, under myopia, the reform reduces the overall allowances
supply only little. Contrary, if firms have long planning horizons or even perfect
foresight, they bank in order to follow their optimal abatement path. Hence the
MSR intake is larger and more allowances are cancelled, reducing the overall
allowance supply.
Against first intuition, the overall supply reduction induced by the reform
is substantially higher under perfect foresight than under myopia. If firms are
extremely myopic, the MSR mechanism will not be triggered and no allowances
will be cancelled at all. Yet, despite larger cancellation volumes under perfect
foresight, the total discounted abatement costs are always smaller.
4.4. Model Results with Hedging Requirements
As discussed in Section 4.2.4, firms may be risk averse and hence follow hedging
schedules to mitigate their allowance price risk. In order to understand how
hedging requirements of firms drive the model results of the EU ETS, we analyze
61900 million allowances are backloaded and 600 million allowances remain unallocated. Thus,
1500 million allowances are stored in the MSR instead of being auctioned.
62Despite the difference in the modelling approach, our findings thereby support the intuition
shown in Willner (2018) who argues that the MSR decreases the additional costs imposed by
myopia and moves the market closer to the minimum cost outcome under perfect foresight.
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in this section the impact of different hedging shares in the pre- and post-reform
market.
Figure 4.2.: Allowance prices, emissions, TNAC and hedging volumes for the pre- and
post-reform scenario with different hedging schedules
Figure 4.2 shows the model results under perfect foresight for the different
hedging schedules given in Table 4.1. In the pre-reform case, the impact of
hedging requirements is rather small. For all considered hedging schedules, prices
follow the Hotelling rule throughout the time span considered. Because the
short-run supply of allowances is rather high in the pre-reform case, firms hold
a relatively large TNAC even without hedging requirements, e.g. the TNAC
falls below 1500 Mt of allowances only after 2027, whereas the hedging volume
starts to decline from 1500 Mt in 2013 even in the high 80% case. Thus, in the
pre-reform case, even for large hedging shares the hedging constraints are not
binding during the considered time period but only bind after 2035. As hedging
constraints become binding earlier for high hedging requirements, the price level
increases slightly with the hedging share, leading to slightly lower emissions and
a higher TNAC. The price level of the 80% case in 2030, for example, is only 6%
above the scenario without hedging requirements, leading to fewer aggregated
emissions of 350 Mt until 2030. Given this hedging schedule, the corresponding
TNAC is about 350 million allowances larger than without hedging requirements.
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In contrast, in the post-reform case hedging requirements have a major impact
on the price development. Without hedging requirements and with hedging
shares below 40% the Hotelling price path is still feasible throughout the time
span considered. However, with larger hedging shares (e.g. in the 60% and 80%
case), the Hotelling price path is only feasible for certain periods of time (e.g.
until 2023). The price path is corrected downwards when the hedging constraint
binds (e.g. between 2023 and 2024 by 1% and by 12%, respectively).
As the short-run supply of allowances is smaller in the post-reform case (due
to backloading and the MSR), the TNAC decreases sharply without hedging
requirements, enabling relatively high emissions and low prices. As hedging
requirements are introduced, the TNAC is obliged to lie above the required
hedging volume (which is increasing with the hedging share and decreasing with
future emissions). Emissions therefore have to be reduced in the short term
in order to bank the ”excess” allowances for hedging requirements for future
emissions. This drives down emissions while simultaneously driving up prices as
they have to be equal to marginal abatement costs.
Additionally, hedging requirements lead to a supply shortage of allowances in
the short run. As allowances are needed not only for compliance but also for
hedging, this scarcity of allowances drives prices up. The price dumps shown in
Figure 4.2 (e.g. from 2023 to 2024 under the 60% hedging schedule) depict the
point in time when hedging requirements become binding but the aggregated
supply up to this point does not suffice for a higher emission level when simul-
taneously fulfilling the hedging requirements. One can conclude that a supply
shortage occurs in the short run which is resolved once the annual allowance
supply increases due to the reduced intake rate of the MSR.
The model allows for such downward corrections of prices as the Hotelling
price rule (Equation 4.2) is only applied if the TNAC is strictly greater than the
required hedging volume. A smoothing of the price path to follow the Hotelling
rule is not possible because of two effects: on the one hand, it is not feasible for
equilibrium prices to be on a lower level before the price dump, as this would
require more emissions and hence a larger hedging volume and a higher allowance
demand, which is not met by the allowance supply in that time.63 On the other
hand, it is not feasible for the equilibrium price path to move to a higher level
after the price dump. This would require more abatement efforts and hence
lead to unused allowances. Consequently, neither a lower equilibrium price level
before the price dump nor a higher equilibrium price level after the price dump
would lead to an efficient abatement path. Hence, given the restrictive allowance
supply, a price dump is inevitable for larger hedging requirements.
63This shortage is due to the short-run supply shortage induced by the reform and the restrictive
allowances supply. If the regulator would issue all allowances at the start of the EU ETS
instead of issuing allowances on a yearly basis, firms could follow their optimal abatement
path, leading to a cost-efficient market outcome as depicted by the original Hotelling model.
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The higher the hedging requirement, the earlier the supply shortage happens,
resulting in more abatement efforts before and less abatement efforts after the
supply bottleneck. Before the price dump in 2024 for example, the price level
in the 80% hedging scenario is 71% higher than in the scenario without hedg-
ing requirements. This price difference reduces to 28% in 2030. Until 2030,
a hedging share of 80% leads to 3600 Mt C02e fewer emissions than without
hedging requirements. The correspondingly larger TNAC triggers an additional
cancellation of 2600 million allowances.
To understand the effect of the EU ETS reform under hedging requirements, we
compare the pre- and post-reform model results. The EU ETS reform increases
overall prices in the third and fourth trading period.64 Without hedging require-
ments the reform increases prices only little (cf. Beck and Kruse-Andersen, 2020
and Bocklet et al., 2019). However, the larger the hedging share, the larger the
price effect of the reform. While hedging requirements call for a TNAC of a
certain size, the MSR reduces the number of allowances available for banking.
Thus, the hedging constraint becomes binding earlier in the post-reform setting,
increasing prices. Additionally, the MSR and cancellation volumes also increase
with the hedging shares as the hedging requirements increase the TNAC. This
leads to a shortage of allowances in the post-reform case with large hedging re-
quirements, amplifying the price effect of the reform. This is in line with Tietjen
et al. (2019) who suggest that neglecting hedging requirements may have led to
a underestimation of cancellation volumes.
Since the Hotelling price rule only holds as long as the TNAC is larger than
the respective hedging requirements, the physical shortage of allowances in the
short-run leads to an elevated price level followed by a downward correction of
the Hotelling price path.
4.5. Explaining the Market Outcomes of the Third
Trading Period
So far, theoretical models fail to give fundamental explanations of the market
outcomes in the third trading period and in particular the allowance price in-
crease in the aftermath of the EU ETS reform. As shown in Bocklet et al. (2019),
the MSR and cancellation mechanism cause a price increase mainly in the long
run. Hence, in models under perfect foresight the price increase in the short run
is only small since prices are discounted based on the Hotelling rule.
In reality, allowance prices in the EU ETS remained at a low level at the
beginning of the third trading period and rose significantly in the aftermath of
the reform. Despite this price spike, the TNAC remained roughly at the same
level.
64A long term price effect of hedging requirements or the reform does not exist, as finally
backstop costs have to be met in every Hotelling model.
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In this section, we replicate those stylized facts of the third trading period
in order to unravel the underlying drivers of the EU ETS market outcomes.
Using our theoretical Hotelling model with myopia and hedging requirements, we
replicate in particular the following market outcomes of the EU ETS (European
Commission, 2019):
• At the beginning of the third trading period and before the reform, prices
remained at a low average price level of 5 EUR/t in 2013.
• Annual allowance prices rose to over 24 EUR/t in 2019.
• The TNAC fell from around 2100 million allowances in 2013 to around
1650 million allowances in 2016, where it roughly remained since.
In order to compare the model results with the real market outcomes, the
prices of the pre-reform model in 2013 serve as benchmark for the initial price
level. The difference between the pre-reform price in 2013 and the post-reform
price in 2019 is compared to the price increase observed in the third trading
period.65 The private bank in the post-reform scenario is compared to the real
TNAC in 2018.
4.5.1. Explaining Market Outcomes Through Myopia
We first evaluate if the market outcomes can be explained through the reform
fundamentals given that firms are myopic.
As discussed in Section 4.3, the more myopic a firm is, the lower the initial
price level in the market. We find that a planning horizon of 10 years is able
to replicate the observed price level in the beginning of the third trading period
best (compare Figure 4.3).
Figure 4.3.: Impact of the reform on market outcomes with a planning horizon of 10
years
65The market outcomes in the EU ETS are driven by firms’ expectations. Since it is not clear at
what point of time firms acknowledge the new regulatory setting, we refrain from depicting a
precise transition path from the pre- to the post-reform scenario. The post-reform scenario
before firms adapt to the reform and the pre-reform scenario after the reform has been
acknowledged serve as counterfactuals, respectively.
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The respective scenario results show a price increase of around 16 EUR/t and
thus a similar size than the absolute price increase of 19 EUR/t observed in the
market. A shorter planning horizon captures the price increase even better, but
at the same time decreases the initial price level below the price level observed
in the beginning of the trading period. Note that given myopia, the reform itself
impacts prices only little but the main part of the price increase is caused by the
updating of the rolling horizon approach. Thus, prices would have increased in
almost similar magnitude even without the reform.
A planning horizon of 10 years further leads to a private bank of only 900
million allowances in the post-reform scenario in 2018, only half the size of the
real TNAC. Longer planning horizons - or even perfect foresight - replicate the
real TNAC better. However, a large private bank comes at the expense of higher
initial prices and a smaller price increase.
Since myopia reduces the initial price level and the private bank while increas-
ing the price effect induced by the reform, the stylized facts can not be met
simultaneously through a variation of the planning horizon.
We conclude that if firms are myopic, the price increase observed in the market
has not been caused by the reform fundamentals but mainly by the updating of
firm’s decision in order to meet the reduced allowance supply. Since myopia lacks
explanatory power when it comes to the large bank held by firms in the market,
we reason that myopia was arguably not the only fundamental driver of market
outcomes in the third trading period.
4.5.2. Explaining Market Outcomes Through Hedging
Requirements
We now turn to the alternative explanation, namely that given hedging require-
ments, the EU ETS reform leads to a price increase and a TNAC of a considerable
size. As analyzed in Section 4.4, the larger the hedging requirements, the larger
the price effects induced by the reform. However, large hedging schedules also
imply large initial prices levels and thus constitute a mismatch to the market
outcomes observed in the EU ETS.
Nonetheless, we find that if firms apply a hedging schedule of 60% the stylised
facts observed in the market can be replicated best (compare Figure 4.4).
If firms follow this exogenous hedging schedule, prices increase by over 18
EUR/t between 2013 and 2019. The difference between the pre-reform price
path and the post-reform price path grows over time. Hence, the later firms
acknowledge the reform, the steeper the price increase visible in the market.
Besides the absolute price increase, the 60% hedging schedule also replicates
the banking behavior of firms in the market well. In order to account for the
supply shortage induced by the MSR intake, firms keep an average private bank
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Figure 4.4.: Impact of the reform on market outcomes with a hedging schedule of 60%
of around 1700 million allowances between 2017 and 2019, comparable to the
magnitude of the TNAC observed in the market.
Thus, two stylized facts, the absolute price increase and the level of the TNAC,
can be replicated by incorporating hedging into the model. Still, none of the
hedging schedules are able to depict the absolute price level in particular in the
beginning of the third trading period since perfect foresight causes firms to abate
already in the short run.
We conclude that given hedging requirements, the model performs well in
attributing the price increase to the EU ETS reform. While hedging requirements
are also able to explain the large private bank held by firms in the market, they
lack explanatory power when it comes to replicating the absolute price level in
the beginning of the third trading period. Thus, hedging requirements on their
own cannot fully explain the impact of the reform on market outcomes in the
EU ETS.
4.5.3. Explaining Market Outcomes Through a Combination of
Myopia and Hedging Requirements
In the previous sections, we find that neither myopia nor hedging requirements
are able to fully explain the impact of the reform on stylized EU ETS market
outcomes. Thus, we examine whether a combination of both forms of bounded
rationality is able to capture the market outcomes of the EU ETS.66
When applying a planning horizon of 10 years along with a hedging schedules
of 50%, i.e. if firms hedge 50% of their allowances one year ahead, 25% two
years ahead and 8% three years ahead, the model results match the stylized
facts (compare Figure 4.5):
66While hedging requirements and myopia might seem conflicting concepts at first, it is likely
that even though firms have a limited planning horizon, they mitigate price risk within the
respective planning horizon. Thus, myopia and hedging requirements can be combined as
long as the planning horizon exceeds the time span of the hedging schedule.
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Figure 4.5.: Impact of the reform on market outcomes with a planning horizon of 10
years and a hedging schedule of 50%
The initial price level in the pre-reform scenario lies at 4 EUR/t and therefore
only slightly below the price level in the beginning of the third trading period.
Due to the reform, prices rise to 26 EUR/t in 2019 in the post-reform scenario,
closely resembling the price increase visible in the market. The real world TNAC
until 2014 matches the private bank modelled in the pre-reform scenario and
closely resembles the post-reform private bank of around 1630 million allowances
in 2018.
The simple comparison of the model results with the stylized facts in Figure
4.5 suggests that firms in the market started taking notice of the policy changes
already before the last reform took place in 2018 by adjusting their decisions in
expectation of the post-reform regulation. The price increase observed in the
midst of third trading period thereby reflects the transition from the pre-reform
to the post-reform market.
In conclusion, we find that a theoretical model of the EU ETS is indeed able
to attribute the price increase to the reform fundamentals if myopia and hedging
requirements are both taken into account.
4.6. Conclusion
In the paper at hand, we use a discrete-time partial equilibrium model to analyze
the impact of the EU ETS reform on allowance prices. We contribute to the
existing literature by finding that theoretical models of the EU ETS need to
take bounded rationality into account when they aim to explain the sudden
price increase of the recent reforms in the midst of the third trading period.
We show that even though the Hotelling price rule is ex-ante applied in a firm’s
planning phase, it is not necessarily visible ex-post in a setup that considers
myopia or hedging requirements. In line with the suggestions of Krautkraemer
(1998), we show that prices deviate ex-post from the Hotelling price path if




While myopia and hedging requirements do not have a major impact on the
pre-reform model results, they strongly drive results once the EU ETS reform
(i.e. backloading, the MSR and the cancellation mechanism) is introduced:
First, if firms are myopic, they neglect future scarcity of allowances by emitting
more in the short run than under the cost-minimal abatement path. This friction
is mitigated by the introduction of the MSR which counteracts the firm’s time
preferences. The effect of the cancellation mechanism diminishes under myopia,
as a short planning horizon implies a small private bank and thus low cancellation
volumes.
Second, hedging requirements reinforce the impact of the reform on model
results. In particular, cancellation volumes increase with hedging requirements.
Thus, if hedging requirements are considered, the overall effect of the reform is
larger than depicted by the prevalent theoretical models. Further, the restric-
tive allowance supply in the EU ETS along with binding hedging requirements
of firms lead to physical shortages in the market. Thereby prices might even
decrease when the binding hedging constraint suspends the Hotelling price rule.
Further, we find that under myopia as well as hedging requirements prices
in the EU ETS increase in the short run. While myopic behavior on its own
fails to explain the large private bank held by firms in the market, hedging
requirements by themselves cannot explain the low price level in the beginning of
the third trading period. If both forms of bounded rationality are combined, the
initial price level, the price increase and the large TNAC can be simultaneously
replicated within a theoretical Hotelling model. We deduce that a combination of
myopia and hedging requirements provoked the reform to fundamentally increase
prices and might thus be the missing piece to the puzzle.
In the paper at hand, we model market frictions caused by myopia and hedging
requirements. Thereby other forms of bounded rationality and other market fric-
tions, such as asymmetric information or incomplete markets, are not considered
within our model. Further, the model is simplified by assuming that risk averse
firms stick to exogenous hedging schedules. We thus neglect that the allowance
demand of a firm for hedging requirements might be endogenously determined
in response to changing expectations on input prices as suggested in Schopp and
Neuhoff (2013).
Further, Tietjen et al. (2019), point out that risk averse firms might apply a
lower interest rate in times when their private bank is sufficiently large, i.e. when
the TNAC exceeds the hedging requirements. Policy interventions such as the
recent EU ETS reform increase uncertainty and might further impact the interest
rate applied by firms in the market (Salant, 2016). Thus, in order to understand
the economic impacts of the EU ETS reform even better, the interplay between
interest rate, hedging requirements and governmental regulations should be the
subject of further research.
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5. On the Time-Dependency of MAC
Curves and its Implications for the
EU ETS
5.1. Introduction
The mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions requires a fundamental overhaul of
the capital stock, i.e., investments in low-carbon technologies. The efficient co-
ordination of investment capital is essential to minimize overall abatement costs.
Economists agree that the pricing of emissions is a suitable instrument for allo-
cating capital efficiently (e.g., Coase, 1960 and Borenstein, 2012). By introducing
the European emissions trading system (EU ETS), the EU has implemented a
quantity control system with an endogenous price on emissions. The EU ETS
requires that firms in the power sector, energy-intensive industries, and inner-
European aviation submit allowances to cover their emissions. Overall, the EU
ETS regulates about 40 % of total European emissions.
The latest reform of the EU ETS has introduced the Market Stability Re-
serve (MSR) and the Cancellation Mechanism (CM), which have fundamentally
changed the EU ETS to a system with restricted banking and responsive al-
lowance supply (cf. Bocklet et al., 2019). A comprehensive literature strand
evaluates the reforms’ impact via partial equilibrium models of the EU ETS
(e.g., Perino and Willner, 2016 and Bocklet et al., 2019). Most of these arti-
cles do not model allowance demand endogenously.67 They assume allowance
demand exogenously based on marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves. MAC
curves match emission mitigation with abatement costs and have been crucial
tools to evaluate environmental policies for decades (e.g., Jackson, 1991 or Aa-
heim et al., 2006).
In the EU ETS related literature, the assumptions on MAC curves are het-
erogeneous. While some articles assume linear MAC curves (e.g., Perino and
Willner, 2016 or Bocklet et al., 2019), others use convex MAC curves (e.g.,
Beck and Kruse-Andersen, 2020 or Schmidt, 2020). Without evidence from the
literature, papers usually presume a time-independent shape of MAC curves.
Nevertheless, both the shape as well as its development over time drives results.
In particular, these assumptions affect total emissions in the EU ETS due to the
responsive allowance supply of the EU ETS.
67To the best of our knowledge, Bruninx et al. (2020) present the only approach that combines
power market modelling with a depiction of the EU ETS regulation.
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This paper assesses the fundamental properties of MAC curves and their impli-
cations for the EU ETS. To this end, we carry out a case study to derive stylized
MAC curves for the European power sector. Multiple runs of a partial equi-
librium model map carbon price paths onto emission abatement. We find that
MAC curves are convex. The curvature is subject to economic developments,
such as fuel prices and interest rates. Further, MAC curves are time-dependent.
In the short term, they are steep since coal-to-gas fuel switching is the only
abatement measure. With enlarging investment opportunities and technological
learning, MAC curves flatten over time.
Assuming convex instead of linear MAC curves increases banking since future
abatement becomes relatively more expensive. On the contrary, flattening lowers
incentives for banking. Under idealized assumptions, steep short-term MAC
curves shift the equilibrium price path upward while also reducing short-term
banking. This effect could cause strong price reactions in the short term when
market frictions such as myopia are considered. For a numerical evaluation of
these effects, we propose methodological approaches to account for the time-
dependency of MAC curves.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 5.2 reviews the
prevailing literature on MAC curves. Section 5.3 derives stylized MAC curves
for the European power sector. Section 5.4 discusses the implications of the
identified properties of MAC curves for the EU ETS. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2. Prevailing Literature on MAC Curves
This section sheds light on the properties of MAC curves discovered in the ex-
isting literature. We consider quantitative evaluations as well as qualitative
discussions of MAC curves.
The prevailing literature uses four methodological approaches to quantitatively
evaluate MAC (compare Huang et al., 2016): (1) Estimations based on distance
functions, (2) expert-based evaluations, (3) top-down models, and (4) bottom-up
models.
MAC evaluation via distance functions estimates past and present marginal
abatement costs based on historical data (Ma et al., 2019). For example, Du
et al. (2015) find that the marginal abatement costs in the Chinese energy system
increase over time in a convex shape. However, these historical observations do
not allow statements about future MAC or the construction of MAC curves.68
Expert-based evaluations, e.g., performed by McKinsey & Company (2013),
derive MAC curves by gathering expert knowledge on abatement costs and po-
68In particular, observed marginal abatement costs reflect rather the part of the MAC curve
with low mitigation efforts, which likely do not represent MAC for extensive emission miti-
gation. For a comprehensive and critical review of MAC evaluation by distance functions,
the reader is referred to Ma et al. (2019).
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tentials. While revealing abatement potential even at negative abatement costs,
the derived MAC curve for 2030 is convex-shaped in its positive part.
The use of top-down models, mostly integrated assessment models, covers
economy-wide activities, their interactions, and the consequences on the natural
environment at a global level.69 For the EU ETS sectors, Landis (2015) finds
that MAC curves are convex in abatement.
In contrast to top-down models, bottom-up partial equilibrium models ab-
stract from global interactions between the different economic sectors but allow
for more technical details. Kesicki (2013) finds that the MAC curve of the UK
energy system in 2030 is convex-shaped and robust to changes in fossil fuel prices,
but depends strongly on the underlying interest rate. Delarue et al. (2010) find
that short-run abatement in the European power markets depends on the car-
bon price as well as on the price margin between coal and gas. Van den Bergh
and Delarue (2015) compare two abatement options, namely fuel-switching from
coal to gas and wind investments, with a model of the central-western European
power sector. They point out that MAC of the different abatement options are
not additive but impact each other.
Summing up, articles with different methodological approaches consent that
MAC curves are convex. However, Kesicki and Ekins (2012) generally calls
for caution when interpreting MAC curves. MAC curves depend on uncertain
assumptions, which are often not transparent. Further, the concept of MAC
curves takes the perspective of a perfectly informed central planner who decides
cost-efficiently on abatement under perfect foresight. In reality, the decisions
on abatement measures depend on individual preferences. If individuals decide
solely based on abatement costs and their actions are coordinated in perfect
markets, the cost-efficient MAC curve of the central planner coincides with the
aggregation of individual decisions on abatement measures. However, individual
decision-making is subject to non-financial costs and behavioral aspects. Conse-
quently, MAC curves of a central planner often identify abatement measures with
negative abatement costs, which are not realized yet. Moreover, MAC curves are
always a static snapshot in time and do not reveal what abatement measures are
taken before and after the reference year. Historic abatement and expectations
about future abatement drive the shape of MAC curves.70
69Most integrated assessment models use a computable general equilibrium framework to depict
economic interrelations via substitution elasticities. Kuik et al. (2009) provides a compre-
hensive meta-analysis on the derivation of MAC curves with integrated assessment models.
70At the same time, today’s decisions on abatement also impact future’s abatement costs, e.g.,
due to technological learning effects.
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5.3. Case Study: MAC Curves of the European
Power Sector
To illustrate the different properties of MAC curves, this section carries out a
case study for the European power sector.
5.3.1. Methodological Approach
Power Market Model DIMENSION
We derive MAC curves with the partial equilibrium European power market
model DIMENSION.71 By assuming inelastic electricity demand in the short
term and perfectly competitive markets without transaction costs, the decision
making of individual, profit-maximizing firms under perfect foresight is equiv-
alent to a central planner’s cost minimization problem. The central planner
minimizes the total discounted costs of investments in power plants and their
dispatch to satisfy electricity demand. Appendix D.1 presents the most relevant
equations of DIMENSION.
Approach for Deriving MAC Curves
To obtain MAC curves for the European power sector, we feed different carbon
price paths τ into the model and derive the corresponding level of emissions
emissions(y)|τ for each considered year y. The emissions of the baseline scenario
(baseline emissions) u(y) := emissions(y)|τ=0 are used to define the abatement
level of a carbon price path τ as abatement(y, τ) = u(y)−emissions(y)|τ . Figure
5.1 sketches the methodology to derive MAC curves using the power market
model DIMENSION.
We assume that carbon prices develop according to the Hotelling rule (cf.
Hotelling, 1931), i.e., they rise with the interest rate.72 The model derives MAC
curves in time period t anticipating this price development for a time horizon H
of 15 years.
71The model DIMENSION has been developed by Richter (2011) and has been used in many
analyses, e.g., Bertsch et al. (2016), Peter and Wagner (2018) and Helgeson and Peter
(2020).
72Emission allowances are a scarce resource. Rational firms with perfect foresight use allowances
so that the corresponding carbon price increases with their private interest rate. Otherwise,
arbitrageurs could take advantage of inter-temporal price differences. Ex-post, prices de-
velop differently due to external shocks or new information on future costs or demand (cf.
Bocklet and Hintermayer, 2020).
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Figure 5.1.: Schematic illustration of the approach for deriving MAC curves
Parametrization
This case study derives stylized facts on MAC curves, using the European power
sector as an example. To isolate the impact of single restrictions or input pa-
rameter changes, we keep the parametrization as plain as possible. We fix the
status quo of European power plants, i.e., we abstract from decommissioning due
to technical restraints or political goals. We assume the existing fleet of power
plants in 2019 according to the database developed at the Institute of Energy
Economics at the University of Cologne, which is continuously updated based
on Platts (2016), Bundesnetzagentur (2020) and ENTSO-E (2020). Net transfer
capacities develop according to the ENTSO-E Ten-Year Network Development
Plan 2018 (ENTSO-E, 2018). Fuel prices, investment costs, net trade capaci-
ties, and electricity demand are as of 2019. By default, we use an interest rate
of 8%. Time-series rely on the historical weather year 2014. For keeping the
model tractable, 16 representative days approximate the development for one
year. Appendix D.2 gives an overview of the considered technologies and their
techno-economic parameters.
5.3.2. The Change of MAC Curves over Time
This section evaluates how different lead times for investment affect MAC curves.
In the short term, the power plant fleet is fixed. Switching electricity generation
from power plants with higher carbon intensity (e.g., hard coal or lignite) to
power plants with lower carbon intensity is the only viable abatement measure
(Fuel Switching). The existing capacity of the power plants with lower carbon
intensity limits the abatement potential of fuel switching. With longer lead
times, investment into generation capacities as a reaction to higher carbon prices
is possible. Yet, installation capacities or necessary approval processes restrict
the speed of changing the power plant fleet via investments. In the long term,
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freedom to invest is unrestricted. Additionally, demand can react to rising carbon
prices, e.g., via investments into energy efficiency or carbon leakage.
For determining the development of MAC curves over time, we make the fol-
lowing stylized assumptions. In the short term, all capacities are fixed and only
the dispatch of the generation portfolio can change with the carbon price. In
the medium term, the expansion of RES capacities must not be higher than five
times the average expansion between 2017 and 2019, reflecting investment lead
times of five years. Investments into gas power plants are restricted to about 9
GW per year within the European electricity system. In the long term, invest-
ments are not restricted. Further, we assume that the development of long-term
demand depends on the carbon price development.73 Ceteris paribus, figure
5.2 depicts the resulting MAC curves for different time horizons and disaggre-
gates the abatement into static fuel switching, (restricted) investment into power
plants, and demand adjustment.74
Figure 5.2.: Short-, medium- and long-term MAC curves and disaggregation of the
abatement measures
In line with the literature, MAC curves are convex independent of the time
horizon. They further flatten over time, primarily due to the increasing invest-
ment possibilities. In the short run, replacing coal generation with gas-fired
power plants allows to reduce emissions. The short-term MAC curve is convex
since modern gas power plants drive inefficient coal power plants out of the mar-
ket already at low carbon prices. Later on, inefficient gas power plants replace
modern coal generators at higher abatement costs.
Progressing in time, fuel switching is not the only abatement option but in-
vestments into modern gas power plants and particularly RES power plants are
possible. As a result, the MAC curves flatten, i.e., the same carbon price results
in higher abatement. While investment restrictions prevail in the medium term,
73We approximate the impact of rising carbon prices on electricity prices via the difference in
marginal costs of modern Combined Cycle Gas Turbine Power Plants (CCGT) and assume
a demand elasticity of 5 % with regard to the electricity price.
74Throughout this paper, the end of the x-axis depicts maximum abatement, i.e., zero emissions.
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unrestricted investment possibilities further flatten MAC curves in the long term.
Besides developments on the supply side, adjustments of the electricity demand
further bend MAC curves downward.75
While the MAC curves above consider variations in investment freedom and
demand adjustment, the following section analyzes how developments in markets
beyond the power sector (i.e., fuel prices and interest rates) or technological
progress affect long-term MAC curves.
5.3.3. Drivers of Long-Term MAC Curves
This section analyzes three exogenous parameters, which influence long-term
MAC curves: fuel prices, interest rates, and technological learning.
Fuel Prices
With regard to fuel prices, the power sector is mainly subject to the development
of gas and hard coal prices. In particular, the margin between these fuels is
considered a major driver. For a stylized illustration of the impact of fuel prices
on the MAC curve, we compare three different levels of gas prices (10, 20, or
30 EUR/MWhth, respectively), while the coal price is not varied. The variation
of gas prices with constant coal prices alters the margin between coal and gas.
Figure 5.3 depicts the corresponding MAC curves.
Figure 5.3.: Long-term MAC curves for different coal-gas price spreads
Lower gas prices affect MAC curves in two ways: First, gas power plants are
more competitive against carbon-intensive coal generation. As a result, more
abatement takes place at lower carbon prices, and the lower end of the MAC
curve shifts downward. Second, investments into RES power plants are less
competitive to gas power plants, since gas generation becomes cheaper. As a
75Based on our stylized assumptions, demand adjustment is only a minor abatement measure.
Whether it is more relevant in reality depends on the assumed elasticity.
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result, the MAC curve becomes steeper at the upper end. For higher gas prices,
the same effects hold true vice versa.
The same reasoning holds with a variation of fuel prices in the short term. As
there is no investment in the short term, the only effect is the altered margin of
fuel switching (see Appendix D.3).
Interest Rates
Apart from fuel markets, the development of financial markets affects the shape
of MAC curves. The interest rate reflects the general development of financial
markets, i.e., the risk-free interest rate, and the risk premium accounting for
sector-specific uncertainty. Figure 5.4 depicts long-term MAC curves for different
interest rates on long-term MAC curves.
Figure 5.4.: Long-term MAC curves for different interest rates
Interest rates primarily affect the weighted costs of capital. The transforma-
tion of the power sector requires capital-intensive installations of RES power
plants. With lower interest rates, RES becomes cheaper. As a result, the MAC
curve is lower at all abatement levels. Since the lower part of the MAC is dom-
inated by fuel-switching, the effect increases with abatement so that it mainly
affects the end of MAC curves. A higher interest rate mirrors the effect of lower
interest rates.
Technological Learning
Until now, we refrain from technological learning. However, new technologies
exhibit possibilities to drive down investment costs or improve technological pa-
rameters such as efficiency. Figure 5.5 depicts the change in long-term MAC
curves with projected technological learning of RES power plants. The respec-
tive cost assumptions can be found in Appendix D.2.
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Figure 5.5.: Long-term MAC curves for different assumptions on investment costs
The impact of technological learning is clear-cut: Lower investment costs drive
down costs of RES generation. Hence, uncertainty about the future development
of techno-economic properties mainly affects the upper part of MAC curves, i.e.,
beyond the potential of fuel-switching.
Beyond improvements of existing technologies, the cost development of so-
called backstop technologies underlines this finding. These technologies are able
to remove an arbitrarily large amount of emissions for a fixed price, the backstop
price. In light of recent plans to establish a hydrogen economy, experts consider
hydrogen-fueled gas turbines as a potential carbon-free and dispatch-able back-
stop technology in the power sector. In this case, the backstop price level is sub-
ject to future costs of hydrogen. The prevailing literature (e.g., Brändle et al.,
2020) projects costs of carbon-neutral hydrogen of roughly 1.5 to 3 EUR/kg.
These prices equal about 45-90 EUR/MWth, the marginal abatement costs to
replace gas generation is thus approximately between 125 and 350 EUR/t com-
pared to gas prices of 20 EUR/MWth.
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Summing up, this case study of the European power sector reveals: first, MAC
curves are convex. Their curvature depends on economic developments such as
fuel prices and interest rates. Second, they flatten over time due to technological
learning and investment restrictions.
5.4. Implications for the EU ETS
As pointed out in Section 5.1, model-based analyses of the EU ETS typically
assume static MAC curves. On the contrary, MAC curves are dynamic. They are
only a snapshot in time so that they conceal dynamic interactions. Further, MAC
curves flatten over time due to restrictions on investments and technological
76The (direct) marginal abatement costs reflect the difference in fuel prices between natural
gas and hydrogen, divided by the emission factor of natural gas of about 0.2 tCO2/MWhth.
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advancements. This section discusses the implications of these findings for the
EU ETS.
5.4.1. The Functioning of the EU ETS
The EU ETS is a cap-and-trade system, which requires firms to buy allowances
to compensate for their emissions. By reducing the yearly supply of allowances
to the market, the EU ETS enforces abatement. Firms are allowed to bank
allowances for later use while borrowing allowances from future allocations is
prohibited.
Firms choose their abatement so that they minimize abatement costs. In
equilibrium, carbon prices equal MAC in a friction-less market. In line with
the Hotelling rule (cf. Hotelling, 1931), the carbon price rises with the interest
rate as long as firms hold a positive bank of allowances. If the aggregate private
bank is empty, the price increases at a lower rate according to the yearly issued
allowances (cf. Bocklet et al., 2019).
In this idealized setting, the market determines an initial price, which reflects
the discounted backstop costs and fully sets up a price path that sooner (lower
initial price) or later (higher initial price) leads to an empty private bank. Market
equilibrium paths, which consist of a sequence of price-emission tuples, solve the
trade-off between low initial prices and a late point in time where allowances are
scarce so that overall (discounted) abatement costs are minimal.
The implementation of the Market Stability Reserve and the Cancellation
Mechanism poses additional restrictions on the banking of allowances. First, if
banking volumes exceed a pre-defined level, the MSR absorbs allowances from
the market. The allowances from the MSR enter the market when the bank falls
below the reinjection threshold.77 Second, the size of the MSR is limited. If the
MSR exceeds the previous year’s auction volume, the CM invalidates overhanging
allowances. As a result of the MSR and the CM, banking decisions affect both the
timing and the total volume of allowance supply. In particular, higher banking
volumes increase cancellation volumes and thus reduce total emissions within
the EU ETS.
5.4.2. Implications of Time-Dependent MAC Curves in the EU
ETS
Chapter 5.3 reveals two properties of MAC curves, which should be considered
in models of the EU ETS: MAC curves are convex and they flatten over time.
If the MAC curve is convex instead of linear, the MAC curve becomes steeper
with higher abatement, which makes future abatement relatively more costly.
77Allowances from the MSR enter the market in junks of 100 million allowances per year if the
previous year’s bank is below 400 million allowances.
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Accordingly, firms bank more allowances to smooth the abatement in the steep
upper part of the MAC curve. Due to the endogenous supply rules in the re-
formed EU ETS, a convex MAC curve causes higher banking volumes and more
cancellation compared to a linear MAC. Osorio et al. (2020) provides quantitative
evidence by comparing the cancellation volumes of several articles. Modelling
approaches that consider convex curvatures (e.g., Bruninx et al., 2020 and Beck
and Kruse-Andersen, 2020), exhibit comparatively high cancellation volumes.
Along the same lines, models of the EU ETS usually assume the shape of the
MAC curves to be time-independent, neglecting that short-term MAC curves are
steeper due to investment restrictions and technological learning. As a result,
abatement is more expensive in the short term and becomes cheaper over time.
Figure 5.6 visualizes the stylized impact of a steeper short-term MAC curve on
the price path in comparison to the assumption of the long-term MAC curve for
all points in time.78
Figure 5.6.: Stylized impact of time-dependent MAC curves on the equilibrium price
path and implications for abatement in the short (ST), medium (MT) and
long term (LT)
Under perfect foresight, the whole price path is determined already in the first
period. Backstop costs are obtained when the last allowance is issued (tsupply=0
in the upper part of Figure 5.6).79 The quasi-linear price development after the
bank is emptied (tb=0,dep. and tb=0,indep.), depends on the allowance supply and
78This stylized analysis assumes that there is only one banking phase. If, for example, the
flattening of MAC curves overcompensates the firms’ interest rate, a second banking phase
is economically rational.
79This holds true as long as backstop costs decrease slower than the firms’ interest rate. In
general, backstop costs only shift the price path as long as the rest of the MAC curve is
kept constant (compare Bocklet et al., 2019). Abatement and banking remain unaltered.
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the shape of long-term MAC curves.80 Firms choose a sequence of price-emission
tuples that suffice the two fundamental rules, namely the price development with
Hotelling until the bank is empty and the equivalence of MAC and carbon prices.
Due to steeper short-term MAC curves (i.e., short-term abatement becomes more
expensive), firms increase their short-term emissions, and thus, decrease banking
volumes. At the same time, prices increase since the short-term MAC are higher
even at the lower abatement level (see Figure 5.6a). In the medium term, the
time-dependent MAC curve flattens and the difference in abatement decreases
but abatement is still lower (see Figure 5.6b). As a result, the bank empties
earlier (tb=0,dep. < tb=0,indep.). In the long term, firms need to increase their
abatement with time-dependent MAC curves due to lower banking volumes (see
Figure 5.6c). Summing up, with time-dependent MAC curves, the price level
rises, and banking decreases in the short-term. Since cancellation volumes in-
crease with short-term banking (see Herweg, 2020), the described effect increases
total emissions due to lower cancellation volumes.
Beyond this theoretical analysis, myopia is considered important to understand
the EU ETS market (compare Bocklet and Hintermayer, 2020). In a myopic
setting, steep short-term MAC curves might be an additional driver of the price
increase observed after the introduction of the MSR and the CM.
All in all, banking and cancellation volumes increase with convexity while
flattening has the opposite effect. Accurate numerical models of the EU ETS
should consider the shape and dynamic evolution of MAC curves to quantify the
overall effects.
5.4.3. Approaches for Time-Dependent MAC Curves in EU
ETS Models
In general, there are two approaches to account for the time-dependency of MAC
curves: using exogenous but time-dependent MAC curves in EU ETS models or
coupling of models for allowance demand and the EU ETS.
Exogenous dynamic MAC curves for the power sector can be derived via mod-
elling, e.g., as described in Section 5.3. Deriving MAC curves for the energy-
intensive industries - as the other large sector within the EU ETS - is more
challenging, since industry processes are more heterogeneous and data availabil-
ity is limited. Further, it is important to depict interactions between the sectors
to account for the non-additivity of abatement measures. For example, the elec-
trification of industry processes saves carbon in the industry sector but interacts
with the MAC curves of the power sector. Feeding the derived time-dependent
MAC curves into a model of the EU ETS improves the accuracy of the results.
However, this approach neglects that MAC curves are interrelated, i.e., they are
80After the private bank is empty, abatement decreases linearly with the allowance supply.
Correspondingly, the price increases in accordance with the upper part of the MAC curve.
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not a sequence of static curves but rather a family of curves, that depends on
the carbon price path.
For considering interactions between the allowance demand and the EU ETS
price path, it is worth to consider the coupling of an allowance demand-side
model (covering the power sector and energy-intensive industries) and an EU
ETS model. Via soft-coupling, the EU ETS model feeds the derived price paths
to the allowance demand-side model, which then updates the MAC curves. By
iterating these steps, a consistent model framework is set up if the model runs
converge. Alternatively, the two models could be hard-coupled, i.e., a simul-
taneous equilibrium is calculated by an integrated approach. For example, the
implementation as a mixed complementary problem (MCP) allows to derive a
consistent solution with an endogenous depiction of allowance demand and the
EU ETS market. Both variants of model-coupling open up possibilities to evalu-
ate alternative EU ETS designs (e.g., the implementation of carbon price floors)
or related environmental policies, such as electrification efforts.
5.5. Conclusion
Recent literature relies on MAC curves to analyze the design of the EU ETS as
the key emission abatement instrument in Europe. While the assumptions on
MAC curves drive the results, the literature on the shape of MAC curves within
the scope of the EU ETS is scarce. Against this backdrop, this paper identifies
implications of MAC curve properties for the EU ETS.
In a case study, we derive MAC curves for the European power sector. To
this end, a partial equilibrium model is fed with carbon price paths to deter-
mine corresponding emission and abatement levels. We identify two fundamen-
tal properties of MAC curves of the European power sector: First, the shape
of MAC curves is convex for all points in time. The curvature depends on eco-
nomic developments, such as fuel prices and interest rates. Second, MAC curves
flatten over time. In the short term, fuel-switching is the only abatement option
and thus, the MAC curve is steep. With longer investment horizons, the degree
of freedom for investment grows and enables the transformation of the capital
stock. This additional abatement option flattens the MAC curve. Further, tech-
nological learning and demand adjustments lowers in particular the upper part
of the MAC curve.
Idealized market equilibrium paths in the EU ETS consist of price-emission
tuples that minimize overall abatement costs and comply with the allowance
supply path. Emission decisions and thus market prices are a trade-off between
emissions today and in the future. After introducing the Market Stability Re-
serve and the Cancellation Mechanism, the total allowance supply and thus total
emissions decrease with banking volumes. With convex MAC curves, marginal
abatement costs increase over time, which makes future abatement relatively
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more expensive compared to today’s abatement. Thus, firms increase banking
volumes compared to linear MAC curves. On the contrary, MAC curves flatten
over time, which lowers the incentives for banking. Considering steeper MAC
curves in the short term leads to a higher price path and an earlier depletion
of the firms’ bank. For quantifying these effects, the time-dependency of MAC
curves should be depicted. A model of the allowance demand side could derive
MAC curves, which are fed into a model of the EU ETS. Ideally, the allowance
demand-side model is coupled with the EU ETS model to derive consistent equi-
librium paths.
Beyond the power sector, MAC curves of energy-intensive industries should
be analyzed to cover the whole scope of the EU ETS. Since MAC curves are
only snapshots of a dynamic context, path dependencies and uncertainties are
worth considering. In particular, the impact of global deep decarbonization and
its implications for MAC curves are a subject of further research.
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A. Supplementary Material for Chapter 2
A.1. Optimization of the Firm, Lagrange Function
and KKT Conditions
Assuming a perfectly competitive allowance market the optimization problem of










s.t. b(t)− b(t− 1)− x(t) + e(t) = 0 for all t = 1, 2, . . . , T
b(t) ≥ 0
x(t), e(t) ≷ 0.
(A.1)
By assigning Lagrange multipliers λ(t) and µb(t) to the banking flow constraint
and the positivity constraints, respectively, we derive the following Lagrangian
function:



















As the optimization problem is convex and fulfills the Slater condition, we
know that the corresponding KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient for
optimality. We derive these conditions by the above Lagrangian function for all
t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T :
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c(u− e(t)) + λ(t) = 0 ∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T (A.4)
∂L
∂b(t)
= λ(t)− λ(t+ 1)− µb(t) = 0 ∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T. (A.5)
Primal feasibility:
b(t)− b(t− 1)−x(t)+e(t) = 0 ∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T (A.6)
x(t), e(t) ≷ 0 ∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T. (A.7)
Dual feasibility and complementarity :
0 ≤ b(t) ⊥µb(t) ≥ 0 ∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T (A.8)
λ(t) ≷ 0 ∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T. (A.9)
A.2. The Impact of Backstop Costs
Lemma Different backstop costs do not change the level of emissions, abate-
ment, TNAC, MSR or cancellation. Only the price path shifts up- or downwards
with higher or lower backstop costs, respectively.
Proof Let bc be some backstop costs, with corresponding cost parameter c(t)
and optimal emissions e(t), abatement u − e(t), TNAC(t), MSR(t), Cancel(t)
and the price level p(t). We know that these variables fulfill both the individual
KKT conditions of the firm stated in A.1 and the regulatory conditions from
sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3.
Now let b̃c be some other backstop costs. We now want to show that the
individual KKT conditions from A.1 and the regulatory conditions are fulfilled
for the same variables and a scaled version of the price path. From the definition
of backstop costs, we know that c̃ = b̃cu =
b̃c











Then we can easily check that p̃(t), λ̃(t) and µ̃b(t) together with the unchanged
quantities e(t), TNAC(t), MSR(t) and Cancel(t) satisfy all KKT conditions and
regulatory market conditions. Hence they give a solution to the problem with
backstop costs b̃c with the same values for the quantities and a scaled price path
p̃(t). 
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As the lemma states, the concrete parameter of the cost function does not
affect the underlying mechanisms of the EU ETS. Only the absolute price level
changes with p̃(t)p(t) =
b̃c
bc . The lemma also holds true for other definitions of c as
long as c · u is not affected by the change of the backstop costs. In particular
it also holds true for time dependent u(t) and c(t) as long as u(t) · c(t) is not
affected.
A.3. Effect of the CM with a Reduced LRF
In Figure A.1 we compare the effect of a CM with the amended LRF of 2.2% to
the effect of a CM given the pre-reform intake rate of 1.74%. The results indicate
that the CM only slightly decreases emissions and increases prices in the short
run. The change in the LRF however, is the main price driver and responsible
for the long-run emission reduction.
Figure A.1.: Effect of the CM
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B. Supplementary Material for Chapter 3
B.1. KKT Conditions for the Firm’s Optimization
Problem
From the optimization problem of the firm (Equation 3.1), the Lagrangian is
derived by assigning multipliers λ(t) and µb(t) to the banking flow and positivity
constraints, respectively:



















As the Slater conditions are fulfilled, the KKT conditions are necessary and












c(u− e(t)) + λ(t) = 0 ∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T (B.3)
∂L
∂b(t)
= λ(t)− λ(t+ 1)− µb(t) = 0 ∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T. (B.4)
Primal feasibility:
b(t)− b(t− 1)− x(t)− f(t)+e(t) = 0 ∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T (B.5)
e(t) ≥ 0, x(t) ≷ 0 ∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T. (B.6)
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Dual feasibility and complementarity :
0 ≤ b(t) ⊥µb(t) ≥ 0 ∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T (B.7)
λ(t) ≷ 0 ∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T. (B.8)
B.2. Supply Rules of the Reformed EU ETS
As borrowing allowances from the future is not allowed, aggregate emissions over






S(t̃) for all t = 0, 1, . . . , T.
In correspondence to the endogenous auction volume, the MSR volume is given
by
MSR(t) = MSR(t− 1) + Intake(t)−Reinjection(t)− Cancel(t),
where the regulatory rules are formalized as
Intake(t) =
{




R if TNAC(t− 1) < `low ∧MSR(t) ≥ R,
MSR(t) if TNAC(t− 1) < `low ∧MSR(t) < R,
0 else.
Further, cancellation takes place if the volume of the MSR exceeds the previous
year’s auction volume, or formally
Cancel(t) =
{
MSR(t)− Sauct(t− 1) if MSR(t) ≥ Sauct(t− 1),
0 else.
B.3. Robustness of the Results with Respect to
Baseline Emissions and Interest Rate
Apart from the CPF regulation, the model in this paper mainly depends on three
parameters: backstop costs, interest rate, and baseline emissions. The following
section discusses the impact of these parameters on the market outcomes in
the base scenario without a CPF. Furthermore, it is analyzed how a different
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choice of these parameters alters the impact of the CPF on the market outcomes,
particularly the aggregate cancellation.
As discussed in Section 3.4, the backstop costs only scale the abatement costs of
firms. Thus, in the base scenario, the equilibrium quantities of allowance trading
do not change with the backstop costs, only the absolute price level shifts. In
particular, the aggregate cancellation remains unaltered if the backstop costs
change. A formalized argument on the price scaling of backstop costs is given in
Bocklet et al. (2019). The impact of the CPF does not change if one accounts
for the scaled price level, i.e., if the CPF level is scaled accordingly. In other
words, for the same absolute CPF level, higher (lower) backstop costs decrease
(increase) the effectiveness of the CPF. In that way, one can reinterpret Figure
3.4 so that different CPF levels represent different backstop cost levels.
Since the level of baseline emissions is uncertain (compare Borenstein et al.,
2019), the following robustness analysis ensures that the results from Section
3.4 remain valid under different assumptions regarding the baseline emissions.
In this regard, two cases are considered where the baseline emissions are 10%
higher or lower. Lower baseline emissions correspond with overall lower demand
for allowances, resulting in an overall lower price level. Thus, initial emissions
are lower, leading to a higher TNAC volume, and thus more cancellation. This
mechanism does not change when the CPF is introduced. With lower baseline
emissions, the overall price level is lower. Thus, the same absolute CPF level has
a bigger impact on the aggregate cancellation as depicted in Figures B.1 (left) and
B.2 (left). The same reasoning holds analogously for higher baseline emissions.
Overall, aggregate cancellation increases with the CPF level regardless of the
chosen baseline emissions, and the increase in aggregate cancellation is faster for
the buyback implementation.
Figure B.1.: Aggregate cancellation for different CPF levels implemented in 2025 with
respect to baseline emissions (left) and interest rate (right)
93
B. Supplementary Material for Chapter 3
By construction, the impact of the CPF is not affected by the implementation
year in the buyback implementation.81 Still, the impact of the CPF is much
higher with lower baseline emissions: additional 2000 Mt aggregate cancellation
due to the CPF for low baseline emissions (1800 Mt) instead of the standard
case (2000 Mt). For the top-up tax, the aggregate cancellation decreases for
later implementation years. With low baseline emissions, the CPF is effective,
even if implemented in 2035. With high baseline emissions, the CPF does not
influence aggregate cancellation if implemented after 2024. Overall, the findings
of Section 3.4 remain valid if the baseline emissions are altered. However, the
absolute size of the effect changes.
The interest rate used represents the opportunity costs of capital for other
investment options for firms. As such, also the interest rate in the market is
prone to uncertainty. In this robustness analysis, a higher (11%) and a lower (5%)
interest rate are exemplary depicted in Figures B.1 (right) and B.2 (right). A
lower interest rate corresponds with a higher initial price level, which is increasing
at a lower rate. Thus, with a lower interest rate, firms abate more in the short
run leading to higher TNAC volumes, more intake into the MSR, and more
cancellation. Only later, the price is below the case with the higher interest
rate, as the increasing rate outweighs the initial price level. The effect on the
aggregate cancellation is only minor because by then, the TNAC is below the
intake thresholds. Due to the higher initial price level, the effect of the CPF is
diminished for lower interest rates. Thus, for the same absolute CPF level, the
impact of the CPF on aggregate emissions is smaller for lower interest rates (B.1
(right)). This line of arguments holds vice versa for a higher interest rate. In
general, aggregate cancellations increase for a higher CPF level regardless of the
underlying interest rate. As before, the increase is faster for the buyback design
as the anticipation of the CPF enforces cancellation.
Figure B.2.: Aggregate cancellation for different implementation years with respect to
baseline emissions (left) and interest rate (right)
81Again, it is assumed that the CPF level increases with the interest rate in this case.
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When comparing different implementation years, the CPF is increasing with
the respective interest rate. The CPF level is set so that it is 40 EUR/t in
2025. By construction, the impact of the buyback CPF is not affected by the
implementation year. However, the impact of the CPF is much higher with a
higher interest rate. With a higher interest rate, the price level is lower, but
the CPF level increases at a higher rate and reaches a higher absolute level. In
contrast, for the case with a lower interest rate, the effect of the CPF is rather
small.
In conclusion, other choices of the main model parameters backstop costs,
baseline emissions, and interest rate change the absolute effect of the CPF on
aggregate cancellation. However, the relationships discussed in Section 3.4.4
are not altered and are robust towards the parameter choices: the effect of




C. Supplementary Material for Chapter 4
C.1. Lagrangian with Hedging Requirements
For the optimization problem M (Equation 4.1) with the hedging constraint
depicted in Equation 4.9 we can derive the corresponding Lagrangian by assign-
ing multipliers λ(t) and µb(t) to the banking flow constraint and the hedging
constraints82, respectively:






















As the Slater conditions are fulfilled for the optimization problem, the KKT
conditions give sufficient and necessary conditions for an optimum. From Eq.















hedgeshare(t− t̃)µb(t̃) = 0 ∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T (C.3)
∂L
∂b(t)
= λ(t)− λ(t+ 1)− µb(t) = 0 ∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T. (C.4)
82Note that the base model without hedging constraints is equivalent to the model with hedging
constraints for hedgeshare(t̃− t) = 0.
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Primal feasibility:
b(t)− b(t− 1)−x(t)+e(t) = 0 ∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T (C.5)
x(t), e(t) ≷ 0 ∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T. (C.6)




hedgeshare(t̃− t)e(t̃) ⊥µb(t) ≥ 0 ∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T (C.7)
λ(t) ≷ 0 ∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T. (C.8)
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D.1. The Power Market Model DIMENSION
Table D.1 presents the notation used within this paper. Capitalized terms repre-
sent endogenous decision variables. Lower case terms denote exogenous param-
eters.
Table D.1.: Sets, parameters and variables
Sets
i ∈ I Elec. generation and storage technologies
m,n ∈M Countries
y ∈ Y Years
t ∈ T Representative time steps
Parameters
d(y, t,m) [MWh] Elec. demand
r [-] Discount rate
avail(y, t,m, i) [-] Availability of elec. generation technology
ntc(y,m, n) [MW] Net transmission capacity
η(i) [MWh/MWh th] Generation efficiency
δ(y, i) [EUR/MW] Annualized investment cost
σ(i) [EUR/MW] Fixed operation and maintenance cost
γ(y, i) [EUR/MWh] Variable fuel cost
τ(y) [EUR/tCO2eq] Carbon price
ν(i) [tCO2eq/MWh th] Fuel-specific emission factor
capadd,min(y,m, i) [MW] Existing or under construction capacity
capsub,min(y,m, i) [MW] Decomm. due to lifetime or policy bans
l(m,n) [-] Relative transmission losses
Variables
CAP (y,m, i) [MW] Elec. generation capacity
GEN(y, t,m, i) [MWh] Elec. generation
EM(y, t,m, i) [tCO2eq] Emissions
CAPadd(y,m, i) [MW] Investments in elec. generation capacity
CAPsub(y,m, i) [MW] Decomm. of elec. generation capacity
TRADE(y, t,m, n) [MWh] Trade flow of elec. from m to n
TC [EUR] Total costs
FC(y) [EUR] Invest and fixed O&M costs
V C(y) [EUR] Variable generation costs
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The central planner minimizes total discounted costs for serving the electric-
ity demand. Consequently, she decides on the investment in capacity and the
dispatch of power plants. The total discounted costs consist of fixed (FC) and




(1 + r)−(y−y0) · [FC(y) + V C(y)], (D.1)
where the fixed costs per year comprise the annualized investment costs and the
fixed operation and maintenance costs for installed capacity. The variable costs
embody generation-dependent costs, namely for fuel and emission allowances.The
installed capacity of electricity generators develops endogenously according to
equation D.2.
For a realistic depiction of European energy markets, equations D.3 and D.4
account for existing as well as under construction capacities (capadd,min) and de-
commissioning due to end-of-lifetime or technology bans (capsub,min). Equation
D.5 formally defines the fixed costs.
CAP (y,m, i) = CAP (y − 1,m, i)+
+ CAPadd(y,m, i) + CAPsub(y,m, i) (D.2)
CAPadd(y,m, i) ≥ capadd,min(y,m, i) (D.3)





CAPadd(ỹ,m, i) · δ(ỹ, i) +
∑
m∈M,i∈I
CAP (y,m, i) · σ(i) (D.5)
Further, the dispatch of installed capacities is restricted by technical con-
straints. First, for every representative time step, electricity generation has to
balance the inelastic demand adjusted by the trade flows from and to neighboring
countries (Equation D.6). Second, electricity generation of each technology and
in each time step is bound by the available capacity (Equation D.7). The avail-
ability factor accounts for maintenance shutdowns of conventional power plants
or the infeed profile of renewable energy. The trade flows are restricted by the
net transfer capacities between countries and have to be symmetric, i.e., exports
from m to n are imports from n to m (Equations D.8 and D.9). Variable costs
comprise fuel costs and costs for emissions (Equation D.10). The former is cal-
culated as the product of generation per technology and the technology-specific
variable fuel costs. The latter is the product of the carbon price and realized
emissions which are calculated through the fuel input and the fuel-specific emis-
sion factor (Equation D.11).
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∑
i∈I




(1− l(m,n)) · [TRADE(y, t,m, n)− (D.6)
− TRADE(y, t, n,m)]
GEN(y, t,m, i) ≤ avail(y, t, i) · CAP (y,m, i) (D.7)
TRADE(y, t,m, n) ≤ ntc(y,m, n) (D.8)
TRADE(y, t,m, n) = −TRADE(y, t, n,m) (D.9)




[GEN(y, t,m, i) · γ(y, i) + EM(y, t,m, i) · τ(y)]
(D.10)
EM(y, t,m, i) = GEN(y, t,m, i) · ν(i)
η(i)
(D.11)
The presented equations constitute the core functionality of DIMENSION: The
objective function D.1 is minimized over the feasible region, which is defined by
the constraints D.2-D.11.
Moreover, the model incorporates features such as ramping and storage con-
straints as well as area restrictions for RES. For a thorough introduction of
DIMENSION and its characteristics, the reader is referred to Richter (2011).
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D.2. Numerical Assumptions
Table D.2.: Considered technologies and their techno-economic characteristics based on
Knaut et al. (2016) and Peter (2019)
Technologies Efficiency Fixed O&M Costs
(EUR/kWa)
Nuclear 0.33 101 - 105
Lignite 0.32 - 0.46 45 - 60
Coal 0.37 - 0.46 40 - 60
Combined Cycle Gas Turbines (CCGT) 0.39 - 0.60 24 -30
Open Cycle Gas Turbines (OCGT) 0.28 - 0.40 12 - 17
Oil 0.4 7
Biomass 0.3 120
PV 1 15 - 17
Wind Onshore 1 13
Wind Offshore 1 93
Hydro 1 11.5
Pumped Storage 0.76 11.5









Table D.4.: Assumed electricity demand per country [TWh], based on 2019 levels ac-
cording to ENTSO-E (2020)
Country Demand Country Demand
AT 67 IE 29
BE 85 IT 307
BG 32 LT 12
CH 62 LV 7
CZ 63 NL 114
DE 530 NO 128
DK 35 PL 156
EE 8 PT 49
ES 248 RO 52
FI 86 SE 132
FR 456 SI 14
GR 51 SK 28
HR 17 UK 263
HU 41
Table D.5.: Technological learning regarding investment costs [EUR/kW], based on the
World Energy Outlook 2019 (IEA, 2019)
Technology Status quo Near Future Far Future
Wind Onshore 1580 1503 1430
Wind Offshore 3985 3038 2600
PV (roof) 883 688 580
PV (base) 750 585 480
OCGT 412 412 412
CCGT 900 900 900
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D.3. Impact of Fuel Prices on Short-Term MAC
Curves
Figure D.1 depicts the impact of different gas prices (10, 20 or 30 EUR/MWhth)
on short-term MAC curves, i.e., if no investments are possible.
Figure D.1.: Short-term MAC curves for different coal-gas price spreads
The lower part of the MAC curve reflects the margin between coal and gas
prices. Under lower gas prices, modern gas power plants replace inefficient coal
generation even without a carbon price signal. Higher gas prices have the oppo-
site effect. Only below 10 EUR/t, higher gas prices do not impact fuel switching
as the margin between coal and gas is not closed by such low carbon prices.
The upper part of the MAC curve is similar since the fuel-switching potential
is reached independently of the gas price. Only minor shifts in the dispatch of,
e.g., biomass affect the MAC curve.
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vergierende Geschäftsmodelle. Technical report, KPMG.




Kuik, O., Brander, L., and Tol, R. S. (2009). Marginal Abatement Costs of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions: A Meta-Analysis. Energy Policy, 37:1395–1403.
Kuramochi, T., Ramı́rez, A., Turkenburg, W., and Faaij, A. (2012). Compara-
tive Assessment of CO2 Capture Technologies for Carbon-Intensive Industrial
Processes. Progress in Energy and Combustion Science, 38:87–112.
Landis, F. (2015). Final Report on Marginal Abatement Cost Curves for
the Evaluation of the Market Stability Reserve. ZEW-Dokumentation, No.
01/2015. Technical report, Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
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